On fuzzy frontiers and fragmented foundations: Some reflections on the original and new institutional economics

Journal of Institutional Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 591-611

  Hodgson, Geoffrey M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84910137602     PISSN: 17441374     EISSN: 17441382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137414000307     Document Type: Article

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