Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform

Public Choice

Volumn 160, Issue 3-4, 2014, Pages 411-428

  Fischbacher, Urs ^a   Schudy, Simeon ^a  

^a University of Konstanz and Thurgau Institute of Economics   (Germany)

Author keywords

Committee voting; Comprehensive reform; Experiment; Vote trading

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904163666     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0097-3     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Alesina, A., & Drazen, A. (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed? The American Economic Review, 81, 1170-1188.
2. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142.
3. Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. The American Economic Review, 90, 166-193.
4. Brams, S. J., & Riker, W. H. (1973). The paradox of vote trading. American Political Science Review, 67, 1235-1247.
5. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
6. Cason, T. N., & Mui, V. L. (2003). Testing political economy models of reform in the laboratory. The American Economic Review, 93, 208-212.
7. Casella, A. (2005). Storable votes. Games and Economic Behavior, 51, 391-419.
8. Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74, 1579-1601.
9. Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 117, 817-869.
10. Cox, J. C., Friedman, D., & Gjerstad, S. (2007). A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 17-45.
11. Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2009). Homo reciprocans: survey evidence on behavioural outcomes. The Economic Journal, 119, 592-612.
12. Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 268-298.
13. Engelmann, D., & Grimm, V. (2012). Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences. The Economic Journal, 122, 1010-1041.
14. Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 293-315.
15. Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2008). Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter. Games and Economic Behavior, 62, 287-303.
16. Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (1998). Reciprocity and economics: the economic implications of homo reciprocans. European Economic Review, 42, 845-859.
17. Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1998). Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets. European Economic Review, 42, 1-34.
18. Fernandez, R., & Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to reform: status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty. The American Economic Review, 81, 1146-1155.
19. Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.
20. Fischbacher, U., & Schudy, S. (2013). Agenda setting and reciprocal vote trading. TWI research paper series, vol. 60.
21. Geng, H., Weiss, A. R., & Wolff, I. (2011). The limited power of voting to limit power. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13, 695-719.
22. Greiner, B. (2004). An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In K. Kremer & V. Macho (Eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen. GWDG Bericht 63 (pp. 79-93). Göttingen: Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung.
23. Heinemann, F. (2004). Explaining blockades to beneficial policy reforms-an empirical investigation. Applied Economics Quarterly, 55, 9-26.
24. Jackson, M. O., & Sonnenschein, H. F. (2007). Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions. Econometrica, 75, 241-257.
25. Kagel, J., Sung, H., & Winter, E. (2010). Veto power in committees: an experimental study. Experimental Economics, 13, 1-22.
26. Leibbrandt, A., & Sääksvuori, L. (2012). Communication in intergroup conflicts. European Economic Review, 56, 1136-1147.
27. Levine, D. K. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 593-622.
28. McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. J., & Smith, V. L. (1998). Reciprocity, trust, and payoff privacy in extensive form bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 24, 10-24.
29. McKelvey, R. D., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1980). Vote trading: an experimental study. Public Choice, 35, 151-184.
30. Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265-281.
31. Paetzel, F., Sausgruber, R., & Traub, S. (2012). Social preferences and voting on reform-an experimental study. Available at SSRN 2066455.
32. Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game-theory and economics. The American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.
33. Rabin, M., & Schrag, J. (1999). First impressions matter: a model of confirmatory bias. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 114, 37-82.
34. Saint-Paul, G. (2002). The political economy of employment protection. Journal of Political Economy, 110, 672-704.
35. Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1, 7-59.
36. Strassmair, C. (2009). Can intentions spoil the kindness of a gift? An experimental study. Munich discussion paper.
37. Stratmann, T. (1992). The effects of logrolling on congressional voting. The American Economic Review, 82, 1162-1176.
38. Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: how political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
39. Tullock, G. (1959). Problems of majority voting. Journal of Political Economy, 67, 571-579.
40. Weiss, A. R., & Wolff, I. (2013). Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? Evidence from the laboratory. TWI research paper series, No. 82.
41. Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2005). Emotion expression in human punishment behavior. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 102, pp. 7398-7401.