Communication in intergroup conflicts

European Economic Review

Volumn 56, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1136-1147

  Leibbrandt, Andreas ^a,c   Sääksvuori, Lauri ^b,c  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Conflict; Experiment; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; EXPENDITURE; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; RENT SEEKING;

EID: 84862747774     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.05.003     Document Type: Article

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