American constitutional exceptionalism revisited

University of Chicago Law Review

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 1641-1707

  Versteeg, Mila ^a   Zackin, Emily ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84903738730     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (294)

1. See George Athan Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard round the World, 1776-1989: A Global Perspective 105 (NYU 2009);
2. Richard B. Morris, The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution 212 (Harper & Row 1970);
3. George Athan Billias, American Constitutionalism and Europe, 1776-1848, in George Athan Billias, ed, American Constitutionalism Abroad: Selected Essays in Comparative Constitutional History 13, 24 (Greenwood 1990);
4. Enrique M. Fernando, The American Constitutional Impact on the Philippine Legal System, in Lawrence Ward Beer, ed, Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence 144, 177 (California 1979).
5. See David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 NYU L Rev 762, 779-808 (2012);
6. Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial Power, in Daniele Caramani, ed, Comparative Politics 162, 173 (Oxford 2d ed 2011);
7. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of World Constitutionalism", 2000 Wis L Rev 597, 598.
8. See also Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, NY Times A1 (Sept 18, 2008).
9. See Law and Versteeg, 87 NYU L Rev at 781-96.
10. See David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 Cal L Rev 863, 876 (2013);
11. Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in Michael Ignatieff, ed, American Exceptionalism and Human Rights 1, 10 (Princeton 2005).
12. See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 454-58 (Anchor 1969) (J.P. Mayer, ed) (George Lawrence, trans).
13. See also Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in G. Nolte, ed, European and US Constitutionalism: Science and Technique of Democracy 119, 120-22 (Council of Europe 2005);
14. Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in Ignatieff, ed, American Exceptionalism 29, 46-47.
15. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 1 (Princeton 1998);
16. James A. Gardner, Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System 23 (Chicago 2005);
17. Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions 1 (Oxford 2009).
18. See generally John J. Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition (Kansas 2006).
19. Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem, in Tom Ginsburg, ed, Comparative Constitutional Design 195 (Cambridge 2012).
20. Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg, Transnational Constitutions ∗13-17 (CentER Discussion Paper No 2013-010, Apr 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2216582 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
21. Law and Versteeg, 101 Cal L Rev 863.
22. See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, The American Constitutional Tradition 107-08 (Nebraska 1988);
23. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich L Rev 761, 819-20 (1992);
24. A.E. Dick Howard, "For the Common Benefit": Constitutional History in Virginia as a Casebook for the Modern Constitution-Maker, 54 Va L Rev 816, 866 (1968).
25. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga L Rev 165, 196 (1984).
26. See, for example, Tom Ginsburg and Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 Stan L Rev 1583, 1602 (2010);
27. Williams, American State Constitutions at 25.
28. See, for example, Ginsburg and Posner, 62 Stan L Rev at 1602-03.
29. See Sanford Levinson, Framed: America's Fifty-One Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance 28 (Oxford 2012).
30. See Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 Rutgers L J 945, 952 (1994).
31. See Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition at 14-18.
32. See Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights, Publius 19, 20-29 (Spring 1992);
33. Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 Temple L Rev 541, 541-42 (1989).
34. see Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Meaning of the Founders' Constitution 276-78 (Cambridge 2005).
35. See Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition at 3-4.
36. See Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions at 94-109;
37. Albert L. Sturm, Methods of State Constitutional Reform 114-15 (Michigan 1954).
38. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 Harv L Rev 1061, 1097 (2010).
39. See Amy Bridges, Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the Western States, 22 Stud Am Polit Dev 32, 43 (2008).
40. See Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition at 4-5.
41. Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1303, 1306 (1994).
42. See also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1485, 1504 (1994).
43. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 529-34, 817-57, 953-97 (LexisNexis 4th ed 2006).
44. see Ill Const Art XIII, §§ 5, 7.
45. See Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America's Positive Rights 91-92, 134-38 (Princeton 2013).
46. See Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions at 161-70.
47. See William J. Brennan Jr, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv L Rev 489, 491 (1977).
48. See People v Anderson, 493 P2d 880, 883 (Cal 1972),
49. Cal Const Art I, § 27.
50. See Robins v Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P2d 341, 347 (Cal 1979),
51. affd, 447 US 74 (1980).
52. See also Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74, 81 (1980).
53. See Joel S. Berke, Recent Adventures of State School Finance: A Saga of Rocket Ships and Glider Planes, 82 Sch Rev 183, 187-89 (1974).
54. See Douglas S. Reed, On Equal Terms: The Constitutional Politics of Educational Opportunity 9-10 (Princeton 2001);
55. Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in "Dialogue": A View from American States, 59 U Kan L Rev 791, 810-12 (2011);
56. Michael Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity: Law and the Politics of School Finance Reform 5-9 (Stanford 2010).
57. See Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temperance Reform, Legal Culture, and the Polity, 1880-1920 39-40 (North Carolina 1995).
58. See Eileen L. McDonagh and H. Douglas Price, Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support in Referenda Voting, 1910-1918, 79 Am Polit Sci Rev 415, 415-18 (1985);
59. Lynda G. Dodd, Parades, Pickets, and Prison: Alice Paul and the Virtues of Unruly Constitutional Citizenship, 24 J L & Polit 339, 361, 429-31 (2008).
60. See McDonagh and Price, 79 Am Polit Sci Rev at 416.
61. See United States v Windsor, 133 S Ct 2675, 2695 (2013).
62. See, for example, Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 NE2d 941, 968 (Mass 2003).
63. See also William N. Eskridge Jr, Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 BU L Rev 275, 283-91 (2013).
64. Arthur Lupia, et al, Why State Constitutions Differ in Their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage, 72 J Polit 1222, 1225 (2010).
65. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Equality and Liberty in the Golden Age of State Constitutional Law 185-210 (Oxford 2008).
66. See, for example, Ginsburg and Posner, 62 Stan L Rev at 1583.
67. CCP Rankings (Sept 7, 2013), online at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings (visited Nov 3, 2014).
68. See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1313-29 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed 2011);
69. Daniel A. Farber, et al, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century 1-15 (West 5th ed 2013);
70. Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law xli-lvi (Wolters Kluwer 7th ed 2013);
71. Kathleen M. Sullivan and Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law lxv-lxxix (Foundation 18th ed 2013).
72. 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
73. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 Mich L Rev 391, 395 (2008);
74. Law and Versteeg, 87 NYU L Rev at 804-06.
75. See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Specificity: Some Preliminary Investigations, in Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, ed, Future of Comparative Study in Law: The 60th Anniversary of the Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, Chuo University 23, 36-38 (Chuo 2011).
76. see Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 2-15 (Harvard 1999);
77. Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 135-37 (Oxford 2004).
78. Constitutional Amendment Rules at 199-201.
79. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012, Dataset Users' Manual ∗17 (Center for Systemic Peace Apr 21, 2013), online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf (visited Nov 3, 2014).
80. See Ala Const Amend 543.
81. See, for example, Ecu Const Art 338;
82. Bhu Const Art 9, ¶ 2.
83. See, for example, Ven Const Art 127.
84. See, for example, Hawaii Const Art X, § 4.
85. La Const Art XIX, § 22.
86. Turkey Const Preamble, Arts 2, 42, 58, 81, 134.
87. See, for example, Del Const Art II, § 17A.
88. See, for example, Bahamas Independence Order Art 26, ¶ 4(e);
89. Bol Const Art 299, ¶ I(4);
90. Switz Const Art 106, ¶ 2.
91. Ala Const Amends 400, 428, 452, 492, 715.
92. Nep Const Art 7, ¶ 2.
93. Swe Const Ch 2, Art 17.
94. See, for example, Switz Const Art 80, ¶ 1;
95. Ger Const Art 20a;
96. India Const Art 51A.
97. Cal Const Art 10B.
98. NY Const Art XIV.
99. Ecu Const Arts 71-74.
100. John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority and Organization, 1870-1970, in George M. Thomas, et al, eds, Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual 71, 77-78 (SAGE 1987).
101. See Fritz, 25 Rutgers L J at 963.
102. See Saïd Amir Arjomand, Law, Political Reconstruction and Constitutional Politics, 18 Intl Sociology 7, 10, 13, 22-23 (2003).
103. See, for example, David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 Cal L Rev 1163, 1225 (2011).
104. The Federalist 308, 313 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
105. See Williams, American State Constitutions at 249-53.
106. See Zackin, Looking for Rights at 34-35;
107. Bridges, 22 Stud Am Polit Dev at 36.
108. See, for example, Ill Const of 1870 Art XIII, § 1 (superseded 1970).
109. See also James E. Leahy, The North Dakota State Constitution: A Reference Guide 156-57 (Praeger 2003).
110. See, for example, Tex Const Art 7, § 10;
111. Mich Const of 1850 Art 13, § 11 (superseded 1908).
112. See Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic Rights as 'Insurance Swaps', 4 Const Ct Rev 1, 12-18 (2011).
113. See Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State Constitutions, in Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb, eds, Toward a Usable Past: Liberty under State Constitutions 388, 401 (Georgia 1991).
114. See Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions at 111-12.
115. See Fritz, 25 Rutgers L J at 967.
116. See, for example, Ger Const Arts 104a-15;
117. Hung Const Art 36;
118. Nigeria Const §§ 59, 173(2), 210(2).
119. See Ginsburg, Constitutional Specificity at 33-34.
120. See US Const Art III, §§ 1-2.
121. See Ala Const Art 6;
122. Ecu Const Arts 167-203.
123. See Williams, American State Constitutions at 28.
124. See Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics 33-42 (Princeton 1996).
125. Minn Const Art XI, § 14.
126. See also Dean Rebuffoni, Voters Back Environmental Amendment by Huge Margin, Star Trib 11A (Nov 8, 1990).
127. Costa Rica Const Art 78.
128. See Nigeria Const Arts 80-84.
129. See generally John Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 Rutgers L J 983 (2007).
130. NY Const Art I, § 18.
131. See District Attorney for Suffolk District v Watson, 411 NE2d 1274, 1286-87 (Mass 1980).
132. Mass Const Art CXVI, amending Mass Const Pt 1, Art XXVI.
133. La Const Art XII, § 15.
134. See Law and Versteeg, 101 Cal L Rev at 932-33.
135. See, for example, Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 Intl J Const L 1, 15-24 (2004);
136. Klug, 2000 Wis L Rev at 605-06.
137. See Ginsburg and Posner, 62 Stan L Rev at 1585-86.
138. See Zackin, Looking for Rights at 18-35.
139. see generally, for example, Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, Incomplete Social Contracts, 1 J Eur Econ Assn 38 (2003).
140. See also Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions as Contract, Constitutions as Charters, in Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 182, 192-201 (Cambridge 2013);
141. Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, and Guido Tabellini, Separation of Powers and Political Accountability, 112 Q J Econ 1163, 1165 (1997).
142. See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557, 562-63 (1992).
143. See Aghion and Bolton, 1 J Eur Econ Assn at 39, 44-51.
144. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am Polit Sci Rev 355, 359, 362 (1994).
145. Julian P. Boyd, ed, 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392, 392, 396 (Princeton 1958).
146. The Federalist at 315.
147. Posner and Ginsburg, 62 Stan L Rev at 1607.
148. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9-17, 252-56 (Princeton 2011).
149. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin Is an American, 25 Yale J L & Humanities 23, 23 (2013).
150. See also Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 10 (Cambridge 2011).
151. But see Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 Vand J Transnatl L 1239, 1282-87 (2011);
152. Yvonne Tew, Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 Colum J Transnatl L 780, 800-32 (2014).
153. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions 129 (Cambridge 2009).
154. See, for example, Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U Pa J Const L 640, 641-44 (1999).
155. see generally Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge 2006).
156. Adam Liptak, "We the People" Loses Followers, NY Times A1 (Feb 7, 2012).
157. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Sanford Levinson, ed, Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 237, 260-62 (Princeton 1995).
158. See Fritz, 25 Rutgers L J at 978, 982.
159. Dinan, American State Constitutional Tradition at 34.
160. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions at 13-14.
161. See Lutz, 88 Am Polit Sci Rev at 360.
162. See Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions at 55-59.
163. See D. Jerome Tweton, Voters Reject New Constitution by Overwhelming Margin, ND Stud (ND Human Council Apr 14, 1972), online at http://www.ndstudies.org/articles/voters-reject-new-constitution-by-overwhelming-margin (visited Nov 3, 2014).
164. See John Devlin, Louisiana Associated General Contractors : A Case Study in the Failure of a State Equality Guarantee to Further the Transformative Vision of Civil Rights, 63 La L Rev 887, 893 (2003).
165. See Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions at 23-24
166. See Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as Agreement to Agree: The Social and Political Foundations (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in Galligan and Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 398, 399
167. Mark T. Carleton, Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 54 Tulane L Rev 560, 560 (1980).
168. See John R. Vile, American Views of the Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 Am J Legal Hist 44, 57-58 (1991).
169. Vreeland v Byrne, 370 A2d 825, 830 (NJ 1977).
170. See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 43-44 (Harvard 2005).
171. See Louis Aucoin, Introduction, in Laurel E. Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making xiii, xiii (Institute of Peace 2010);
172. Thomas M. Franck and Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the Constitution-Making Process, in Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition 3, 8;
173. Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair, in Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition 20, 20.
174. See, for example, Hassen Ebrahim and Laurel E. Miller, Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South Africa: Constitution Making after Apartheid, in Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition 111, 133-39.
175. See, for example, Richard H. Solomon, Foreword, in Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition xi, xi.
176. See Aili Mari Tripp, The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda, in Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition 158, 165-67.
177. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach, in Miller, ed, Framing the State in Times of Transition 57, 61-65.
178. See Erik Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand's 1997 "People's Constitution": Be Careful What You Wish For, 48 Asian Surv 373, 374, 391 (2008).
179. See generally Phoebe King, Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design: Comparing the 1999 Venezuelan, 2008 Ecuadorian, and 2009 Bolivian Constitutions, in Galligan and Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 366.
180. Anne Meuwese, Popular Constitution-Making: The Case of Iceland, in Galligan and Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 469, 483-84.
181. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 201, 206-07 (2009).
182. But see generally Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 Ind L J 1133 (2014).
183. See, for example, Margaret Center Klinglesmith, Amending the Constitution of the United States, 73 U Pa L Rev 355, 371 (1925).
184. Vile, 35 Am J Legal Hist at 68.
185. James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 Rutgers L J 985, 990 (1993),
186. quoting McCulloch, 17 US (4 Wheat) at 415.
187. Pope, 24 Rutgers L J at 985.
188. See, for example, Gail Donoghue and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Life after Brown: The Future of State Constitutional Tort Actions in New York, 42 NY L Sch L Rev 447, 475 n 143 (1998);
189. Peter J. Galie and Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalism and the Amending Process, 1 Hofstra L & Pol Symp 27, 29, 32 (1996);
190. Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 Temple L Rev 989, 1005 (1996).
191. see Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in Galligan and Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 51, 59-62;
192. Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 134-77 (Chicago 1995);
193. Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 68-72 (Cambridge 1979).
194. See Ginsburg and Posner, 62 Stan L Rev at 1606-11.
195. See also James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 73-74 (Michigan 1965).
196. But see generally Aghion and Bolton, 1 J Eur Econ Assn at 38.
197. San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 35 (1973).
198. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv L Rev 1131, 1133 & nn 2-5 (1999).
199. See DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 US 189, 195-96 (1989).
200. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, in Ignatieff, ed, American Exceptionalism 90, 103-05;
201. Kevin L. Cope and Mila Versteeg, In Sickness and in Health: The Constitution Should Give Americans the Right to Basic Health Care, Hive (Slate June 12, 2012), online at http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/in-sickness-and-in-health (visited Nov 3, 2014).
202. See S Afr Const §§ 26-27;
203. Mex Const Art 4.
204. See Louis Henkin, et al Human Rights 217 (Foundation 2d ed 2009);
205. Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United States and Europe: The Constitutional Question, in Nolte, ed, European and US Constitutionalism 131, 134.
206. See Helen Hershkoff, Transforming Legal Theory in the Light of Practice: The Judicial Application of Social and Economic Rights to Private Orderings, in Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, eds, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World 268, 268-97 (Cambridge 2008).
207. Hershkoff, 112 Harv L Rev at 1133,
208. quoting Jackson v City of Joliet, 715 F2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir 1983).
209. See, for example, Jackson, 715 F2d at 1203.
210. But see Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception" against Lofty Formalism, 121 Harv L Rev 4, 21-22, 46-53 (2007).
211. See Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment at 46-47.
212. See, for example, Mont Const Art XII, § 3(3).
213. See, for example, Ohio Const Art II, § 37.
214. See, for example, NY Const Art I, § 17.
215. See, for example, Okla Const Art XXIII, § 5.
216. See, for example, Pa Const Art I, § 27.
217. See, for example, Colo Const Art 16, § 5.
218. See Ward M. McAfee, A Constitutional History of Railroad Rate Regulation in California, 1879-1911, 37 Pac Hist Rev 265, 265-66 (1968).
219. See, for example, Va Const Art I, § 8-A.
220. See generally Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 SLU L J 917 (2012).
221. See, for example, NC Const Art XI, §§ 7-8.
222. See Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era 143-44 (California 2008).
223. Mass Const Pt II, ch V, § 2.
224. See NH Const Pt II, Art 83.
225. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 120-24 (Norton 1972).
226. See Charles E. Bidwell, The Moral Significance of the Common School: A Sociological Study of Local Patterns of School Control and Moral Education in Massachusetts and New York, 1837-1840, 6 Hist Educ Q 50, 51 (Fall 1966).
227. See David Tyack and Robert Lowe, The Constitutional Moment: Reconstruction and Black Education in the South, 94 Am J Educ 236, 238 (1986).
228. See, for example, S Afr Const § 24 (1996);
229. Pa Const Art I, § 27.
230. See David R. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment 13, 17 (UBC 2012).
231. See Zackin, Looking for Rights at 148-53.
232. Peru Const Art 24.
233. See also Ecu Const Arts 325-33;
234. Nigeria Const § 17, ¶ 3;
235. Ven Const Arts 89-97;
236. Bol Const Arts 46-55;
237. India Const Arts 39, 41-43.
238. Wyo Const Art I, § 22.
239. See also Ohio Const Art II, § 34;
240. Nev Const Art 15, § 16;
241. Mont Const Art XII, § 2(2).
242. See, for example, Okla Const Art XXIII, § 4;
243. Okla Const Art XXIII, § 5;
244. Colo Const Art 5, § 25a;
245. Colo Const Art 16, § 2.
246. See, for example, Ecu Const Arts 13, 30, 32.
247. Mont Const Art XII, § 3(3).
248. NY Const Art XVII, § 3.
249. See Katharine G. Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights 66-98 (Oxford 2012).
250. See Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, in Malcolm Langford, ed, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 3, 43-45 (Cambridge 2008); Hershkoff, 112 Harv L Rev at 1135-36.
251. Hershkoff, 112 Harv L Rev at 1135-36.
252. See generally Gauri and Brinks, eds, Courting Social Justice;
253. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, ed, Judicial Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Cases and Materials (Martinus Nijhoff 2005).
254. See also Langford, ed, Social Rights Jurisprudence at 75-208.
255. See, for example, Richard A. Goldberg and Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers' Organizational and Collective Bargaining Rights in New Jersey: Implementing Self-Executing State Constitutional Rights, 18 Rutgers L J 729, 734 (1987).
256. See Reed, On Equal Terms at 9-10, 20-22;
257. Paris, Framing Equal Opportunity at 228-29.
258. See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 Rutgers L J 881, 896-98 (1989);
259. Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33 Rutgers L J 799, 828 (2002).
260. See also Dade County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc v Legislature, 269 S2d 684, 687-88 (Fla 1972).
261. See Zackin, Looking for Rights at 109.
262. See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 Tex L Rev 1921, 1924 (2004).
263. See Law and Versteeg, 101 Cal L Rev at 916-18.
264. See Ginsburg and Posner, 62 Stan L Rev at 1599.
265. See Zackin, Looking for Rights at 48-49.
266. See Hirschl, Toward Juristocracy at 43-46.
267. See King, Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design at 373-74.
268. See Dixon and Ginsburg, 4 Const Ct Rev at 12-14.
269. See Zackin, Looking for Rights at 119-20, 126-27.
270. Holmes, Passions and Constraint at 134-77.
271. See Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J Econ Hist 803, 816 (1989).
272. Kramer, The People Themselves at 12.
273. See Christopher W. Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions, 93 Am Polit Sci Rev 837, 837-38 (1999).
274. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 661 (2011).
275. The Federalist at 521, 524-25.
276. See Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va L Rev 1045, 1067-68 (2001);
277. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 511, 517-18 (2002).
278. See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases 22-30 (Cambridge 2003).
279. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy at 90-91.
280. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (Kansas 1999);
281. Kramer, The People Themselves;
282. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton 1999).
283. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 2-3 (Oxford 2010).
284. See generally Dinan, 38 Rutgers L J 983.
285. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev 1807, 1848-54 (2011).
286. Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, in Galligan and Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 3, 33.
287. See Dag Anckar, Constitutional Referendums in the Countries of the World, 7 J Polit & L 12, 14 (2014).
288. See, for example, Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 45 (Cambridge 1999).
289. See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale L J 1564, 1626-33 (2006);
290. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont L Rev 15, 23-26 (2004).
291. See City of Santa Barbara v Adamson, 610 P2d 436, 439 n 2 (Cal 1980).
292. See State v Robert H., 393 A2d 1387, 1389 (NH 1978).
293. See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 Mo L Rev 1105, 1124-25 (2008);
294. Levinson, 59 Kan L Rev at 796-97.