Originalism at home and abroad

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 780-850

  Tew, Yvonne ^a,b,c  

^a The Earth Institute at Columbia University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^c HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904662666     PISSN: 00101931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (205)

1. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1991);
2. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and the Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997);
3. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999);
4. Jamal Greene, Selling Constitutionalism, 97 GEO L.J. 657 (2009);
5. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999);
6. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998);
7. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (2009);
8. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. .REV. 545 (2006);
9. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011);
10. JACKM. BALKIN, Living originalism (2011).
11. For critics of originalism, see, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009);
12. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009);
13. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713 (2011);
14. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010);
15. Peter J. Smith, How Different are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (2011);
16. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Kagan Embraces Notion of Enduring Constitution; "We Are All Originalists," CNSNEWS.COM (June 20, 2010), http://www.cnsnews.com/ news/article/kagan-embraces-notion-enduring-constitution-we-are-all- originalists; Saturday Night Live, Constitutional Corner (NBC television broadcast Jan. 15, 2011);
18. Amar C. Bakshi, U.S. Constitution: A Flexible Document, GLOBAL PUB. SQUARE (July 7, 2011), http://globalpub licsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/07/u-s- constitution-a-flexible-document.
19. See, e.g., Grant Huscroft & Bradley Miller, Introduction, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 10 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM] ("Originalist theory has little purchase outside of the United States and it is under pressure within the United States. . .");
20. Jill Lepore, The Commandments, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 70 ("Originalism, which has no purchase anywhere but here [in the United States]. ");
21. Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. III. L. REV. 815, 838 (2012) ("American ideas of originalism are not widely adopted outside the United States. . .");
22. Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin is an American, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 23 (2013) ("Inquiring this closely into a constitution's original meaning is done almost nowhere else in the world ");
23. Jack M. Balkin, Why Are Americans Originalist?, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL 2 (David Schiff & Richard Nobles eds., 2015) (forthcoming) ("Originalism is mostly unknown outside of the United States.") [hereinafter Balkin (2015 forthcoming)].
24. Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009).
25. See Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1239 (2011).
26. Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489; see infra Part n.B.i.
27. cf. Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 633, 656 (2004) ("In Europe . recourse to originalism is virtually nonexistent.").
28. The term "popular originalism" has been used by Jared Goldstein and Rachel Zeitlow to describe a popular movement that advances originalist interpretations outside the courts. See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1807 (2011);
29. Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 850-66 (2011);
30. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 484 (2012). While the use of originalist arguments as a form of political rhetoric is one of the aspects I highlight in my discussion, I use the term "popular originalism" to encompass several other features as well. See infra Part JJ.A.2.
31. See David Fontana, Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 189, 197 (2010) (arguing that "countries whose courts and commentators make originalist arguments tend to come from revolutionary constitutional traditions or are acting in revolutionary constitutional moments").
32. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1994)
33. ("[T]he text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of the land . The meaning of all. . legal writings depends on their texts, as they were objectively understood by the people who enacted or ratified them. Originalists do not give priority to the plain dictionary meaning of the Constitution's text because they like grammar more than history. They give priority to it because they believe that it and it alone is law." ); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1142 ("[Ojriginal meaning textualism is the only method of interpreting the Constitution.").
34. Some argue that the claim that originalism follows naturally from treating the constitution as a form of written law may be a more plausible fit for constitutional systems like Australia, where the Constitution is regarded formalistically as a basic legal document making it more conceivably viewed as reducible to its written text. See Lael K. Weis, What Comparativism Tells us About Originalism, INT'L J. CONST. L., 8 (forthcoming) (U. of Melb. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 659), available arhttp://papers.ssrn.com/abstracr=2297158.
35. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1971) (asserting that "where the Constitution does not speak," the "correct answer" to the question "'[A]re we all. at the mercy of legislative majorities?'. . must be 'yes'");
36. see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 314-15 (1977) (arguing that non-originalist constitutional interpretation "reduces the Constitution to an empty shell into which each shifting judicial majority pours its own preferences").
37. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism the Lesser Evil, U. Cm. L. REV. 849, 863-64 (1989)
38. Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., The Right Judicial Litmus Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at A23 ("It is legitimate for courts to decide such issues only when they are enforcing the Constitution as originally understood and ratified by the people-and not enforcing the justices' own views as to what is good public policy.").
39. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. LJ. 1183 (2012);
40. FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013).
41. Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455,465 (1985).
42. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971);
43. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986).
44. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.REV. 204(1980).
45. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 FfARV. L. REV. 885-948 (1984-1985);
46. H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. Cm. L. REV." 1513 (1987).
47. Antonin Scalia, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 106 (1987).
48. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007).
49. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 4,99 (2004) (distinguishing interpretation, which determines the meaning of words, from construction, which "fills the inevitable gaps created by the vagueness of these words when applied to particular circumstances").
50. see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007).
51. see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted Originalism, " 75 U. CiN. L. REV. 7,13-16 (2006).
52. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
53. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311,340 (2005) (concluding that "practice has settled the matter such that the Court does have an autonomous, implied power to sometimes follow precedent").
54. See also John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000).
55. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2009) (challenging the common view that originalism is inconsistent with precedent and arguing that "nothing in the Constitution forbids judges from following precedent").
56. Lee J. Strang, Originalist Theory ofPrecedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1729 (2010).
57. See also Polly J. Price, A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare Decisis, and Property Rights, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 114 (2007) (arguing that "as a matter of original understanding," due to the original meaning of the "judicial power" in Article III, "an originalist owes some obligation to a nonoriginalist precedent.").
58. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 n.2 (2005);
59. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y23,24(1994).
60. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257,263 (2005);
61. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 788 (2010).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.");
63. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 964-65 (1991)
64. (Scalia, J.) (rejecting that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee despite the holding of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983));
65. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that .Roe v. Wade should be overruled);
66. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (Scalia, J.)
67. (arguing that campaign-contribution limits violate the First Amendment, despite the contrary ruling in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
68. see also Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG, Oct. 6, 2013, http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/(last visited Mar. 3, 2014) ("I described myself as [a faint-hearted originalist] a long time ago. I repudiate that.");
69. MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 165 (2013).
70. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
71. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
72. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 12-22 (2005).
73. The book was on the New York Times Best Sellers list. Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at G26, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ fullpage.html?res=9901E5DD103EF937A15757C0A9639C8B63.
74. See, e.g., THE ORIGINALISM BLOG, http://originalismblog.typepad.com (last visited Mar. 14,2014).
75. See, e.g., The Rush Limbaugh Show, Appoint an Originalist, Not an Activist (July 5, 2005), transcript available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/ daily/2005/07/05/appoint-an-originalist-not-an-activist.
76. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Beyond New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 9B05E2DA153EF930A35754C0A9669D8B63.
77. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, WASH. POST, June 29, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062902652.html.
78. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 360 (2011).
79. citing Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds, But They Don't Want Government To Ban It, (July 17, 2008), http://www.quinnipiac. edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/search-releases/search-results/ release-detail?ReleaseID=1194&What=&strArea=;&strTime=28;
80. see also JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 154 (2005);
81. See generally JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, THE MAKING OF THE MALAYAN CONSTITUTION (2002);
82. Poh-Ling Tan, From Malaya to Malaysia, in CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS IN MALAYSIA: THE FIRST 50 YEARS 1957-2007, at 25 (Andrew Harding & H.P. Lee eds., 2007) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS].
83. The similarities between these two countries allow a "most similar cases" comparative constitutional law approach to be employed. See Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 134 (2005) (describing the "most similar cases" approach, which involves comparing cases "that have similar characteristics. . but vary in the values on the key independent and dependent variables").
84. See JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MALAYSIA AND THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (2007) (explaining that "the choice of an independent body made up of legal experts from the Commonwealth was a conscious choice of the ruling Alliance party and was intended to avoid local prejudices in the framing of the Constitution").
85. FEDERATION OF MALAYA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION \ 3 (1957) [hereinafter REID REPORT].
86. ANDREW HARDING, THE CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 32 (2012).
87. Id. pt. I, art. 3(1). See generally Joseph M. Fernando, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, 37 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 249 (2006).
88. Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi Pasir Mas (Susie Teoh), (1990) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 300.
89. Susie Teoh, (1990) 2 MALAYAN LJ. at 301.
90. Andrew Harding, Islam and Public Law in Malaysia: Some Reflections in the Aftermath of Susie Teoh's Case, 1 MALAYAN LJ. xci, xcv (1991).
91. Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. LJ. 55, 57.
92. Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-Ethnic Composition of Malaysia, 13 INT'L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 95,104-05 (2006).
93. Ramlan Said, Islamic State Issue Dominates, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Oct. 27, 2001, at 6;
94. see also Malaysia Recognised as Islamic Nation, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Aug. 11,2001, at 4.
95. Tommy Thomas, The Social Contract: Malaysia's Constitutional Covenant, (2008) 1 MALAYAN L.J. cxxxii, clxxv-clxxvi;
96. Li-ann Thio & Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Religious Dress in Schools: The Serban Controversy in Malaysia, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 671 (2006) (describing the Prime Minister's declaration as "a populist attempt to gain political support in a country where Muslims are a majority comprising some 60.4% of the population");
97. Hassan Saeed, Apostasy Laws in Malaysia: Jurisdiction and Constitutionality, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY, AND ISLAM 160 (Abdullah Saeed & Hassan Saeed eds., 2004) (calling Islamization "a convenient tool" to achieve UMNO's objective of maintaining the political power it had enjoyed since independence).
98. Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v. Fatimah bte Sihi, (2000) 5 MALAYAN L.J. 375 (High Court, Seremban). The High Court occupies the lowest tier in Malaysia's appellate court structure, which comprises of the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Federal Court (previously known as the Supreme Court).
99. Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. L.J. 55, 56.
100. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, (2004) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 119 (H.C.).
101. In practice, obtaining an order of apostasy from the Sharia Courts for a Malay-Muslim appears virtually impossible. There are no official statistics or empirical evidence of persons who have applied for and been granted an apostasy order by the Sharia Courts. Benjamin Dawson & Steven Thiru, The Lina Joy Case and the Future of Religious Freedom in Malaysia, LAWASIA J. 151, 160 (2007).
102. Una Joy, 2 MALAYAN LJ. at 129[18].
103. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, (2005) 5 ALL MALAY. REP. 663,690[27]-91[29], 690 (CA.).
104. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, (2007) 3 ALL MALAY. REP. 585 (F.C.).
105. Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. L.J. 55,56.
106. Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v. Fatimah bte Sihi, (2000) 5 MALAYAN L.J. 375 384.
107. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, (2004) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 119 (H.C.),atl28[18J.
108. Lina Joy, 3 ALL MALAY. REP. at 623[53]-24[53].
109. Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor, (2010) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 333, 339 (observing that "the provisions of the Constitution, in particular the fundamental liberties guaranteed. must be generously interpreted").
110. Tan Tek Seng v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan, (1996) 1 MALAYAN L.J. 261, 288;
111. see also Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v. Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia, (1999) 1 MALAYAN L.J. 266, 271 ("[T]he Federal Constitution, unlike any ordinary statute, does not merely declare law . It also confers upon individuals certain fundamental and inalienable human rights, such as equality before the law. Its language must accordingly receive a broad and liberal construction in order to advance the intention of its framers.") (emphasis added).
112. Lee Kwan Woh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (2009) 5 MALAYAN L.J. 301, 312 (quoting Boyce v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 32).
113. Malaysian courts have found that the right to life protects the right to access to court (Sivarasa Rasiah, (2010) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 333);
114. employment (Tan Tek Seng, (1996) 1 MALAYAN L.J. 261);
115. livelihood under native customary land rights (Nor Anak Nyawai, (2005) 3 CURRENT L.J. 555);
116. and the right to fair trial (Lee Kwan Woh, (2009) 5 MALAYAN L.J. at 316).
117. Sivarasa Rasiah, 2 MALAYAN L.J. 333.
118. Muhammad Human bin Idham v. Kerajaan Malaysia, (2011) 6 MALAYAN L.J. 507.
119. Abdul Aziz Bari, Islam in the Federal Constitution: A Commentary on the Decision o/Meor Atiqulrahman, 2 MALAYAN L.J. cxxix, cxxxv (2000).
120. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, (2004) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 119 (H.C.).
121. Faiza Thamby Chik, Malay and Islam in the Malaysian Constitution, 1 MALAYAN L.J. cxxix, cxlii (2009).
122. Tommy Thomas, Is Malaysia An Islamic State?, 4 MALAYAN L.J. xv (2006);
123. Li-ann Thio, Apostasy and Religious Freedom: Constitutional Issues Arising from the Lina Joy Litigation, 2 MALAYAN L.J. i, xi-xii (2006) ("The revisionist tenor of the interpretive approach Faiza J applied in proffering a contested reading of article 3 is controversial and warrants close analysis. He referred to the framers' intention, including the report of the Reid Commission and the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Proposal 1957 . However, he did not go beyond mentioning these documents which emphasise the secular basis of the Malaysian polity and which were accompanied by assurances that what became article 3 was an 'innocuous' clause not implying 'that the State is not a secular State.'").
124. See, e.g., DAP Defends Secular Malaysia, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Oct. 10, 2001, at 3 (Opposition Democratic Action Party Chairman Lim Kit Siang defended Malaysia's secular basis emphasizing that the party was "consistent in [its] stand on the fundamental constitutional principle propounded by the framers on the Federal Constitution.");
125. DAP Firmly Against the Idea of Islamic State, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), July 12, 2001, at 8 (Opposition figure Karpal Singh called the issue of setting up an Islamic state "an affront to the solemn will of the framers of the Constitution, who, undoubtedly, had as their objective Islam as the religion of the country in the context of a secular state").
126. Malik Munip, Is Malaysia an Islamic or Secular State?, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnist/is-malaysia- an-islamic-or-secular-state-1.171584.
127. See, e.g., Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. L.J. 55;
128. Malik Imtiaz, Latifah Mat Zin: Reaffirming the Supremacy of the Constitution, DISQUIET BLOG (July 29, 2007), http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/ 2007/07/latifah-mat-zin-reaffirmang-supremacy.html.
129. See, e.g., David Tih, Uphold Founding Fathers' Legacy, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.), Aug. 31, 2010, at 40;
130. Art Harun, Secular or Non-Secular: What History Tells Us, MALAYSIAN INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/ secular-or-non-secular-what-history-tells-us-art-harunl.
131. See, e.g., Hootan Shambayati, The Guardian of the Regime: The Turkish Constitutional Court in Comparative Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 99, 117 (2008);
132. Asli Ü. Bâli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 235 (2012);
133. Giines Murat Tezciir, Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 305 (2009);
134. Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. LJ. 55,56-57.
135. Zambry bin Abd Kadir v. Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin, (2009) 5 MALAYAN L.J. 464.
136. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, (2004) 2 MALAYAN L.J. 119 (H.C.).
137. See generally LI-ANN THIO, A TREATISE ON SINGAPORE LAW 02.070-02.086 (2012).
138. See Kevin Tan, The Evolution of Singapore's Modern Constitution: Developments from 1945 to the Present Day, 1 SING. ACAD. LJ. 17 (1989).
139. Cf. MALAY. CONST, art. 3(1) (specifying Islam as the religion of the Federation of Malaysia).
140. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 1966, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 1966, 13 (Singapore Government Printer, 1966) [hereinafter WEE REPORT].
141. See generally Li-ann Thio, The Passage of a Generation: Revisiting the Report of the 1966 Constitutional Commission, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 7 (Kevin Tan & Li-ann Thio eds., 2009) [hereinafter EVOLUTION].
142. Singapore courts have recognized the judiciary's power to strike down unconstitutional legislation in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SING. L. REP. 662, 681 (H.C.);
143. Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SING. L. REP. (R) 78, 88-89 (H.C.);
144. Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 SING. L. REP 103, 120 (C.A.).
145. See generally Li-ann Thio, Beyond the "Four Walls " in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations: Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 428 (2006);
146. Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor (Yong), [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489.
147. CONST. OFTHEREP. OF SING. art. 9(1).
148. See, e.g., R. v. Watson [2005] 1 A.C. 472;
149. Bowe v. The Queen [2006] 1 W.L.R. 1623;
150. Reyes v. The Queen [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (P.C.).
151. Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor (Yong), [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489, [52].
152. P.J. Yap, Constitutionalising Capital Crimes: Judicial Virtue or 'Originalism' Sin?, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 281,284 (2011).
153. See Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor (Yong), [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489 [64].
154. See, e.g., id.; Yvonne McDermott, Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor and the Mandatory Death Penalty for Drug Offences in Singapore: A Dead End for Constitutional Challenge?, 1 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. & DRUG POL'Y 35,40-41 (2010).
155. Yong, [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489, at [92].
156. See, e.g., Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (Aug. 27, 2008), By-Elections Motion, vol. 84, col. 3328 (statement of Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister) ("I am here not to argue constitutional niceties . but to set out the political realities of what works for Singapore and how Singapore has to operate in order that this Government will function well for Singaporeans.") (emphasis added).
157. See Li-ann Thio, It is a Little Known Legal Fact: Originalism, Customary Human Rights Law and Constitutional Interpretation, 2010 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 558 (2010);
158. Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, The Mandatory Death Penalty and a Sparsely Worded Constitution, 127 L.Q. REV. 192 (2011);
159. Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor (Yong), [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489, at [92].
160. Yong, [2010] 3 SING. L. REP. 489, at [61].
161. See, e.g., Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1981] A.C. 648 (P.C.)
162. Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 1 S.G.C.A. 47.
163. Li-ann Thio, The Death Penalty as Cruel and Inhuman Punishment before the Singapore High Court? Customary Human Rights Norms, Constitutional Formalism and the Supremacy of Domestic Law in Public Prosecutor v Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 4 O. U. COMM. L.J. 213 (2004);
164. Michael Hor, The Death Penalty in Singapore and International Law, 8 SlNG. Y.B. INT'L. L. 105 (2004);
165. C.L. Lim, The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor, SING J. LEGAL STUD. 218 (2005).
166. Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. L.J. 55.
167. Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (Dec. 22, 1965), Constitution (Amendment) Bill, vol. 24, col. 421 (statement of Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister).
168. Li-ann Thio, Constitution of the Republic of Singapore: The Indigenisation of a Westminster Import, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 251, 263 (Clauspeter Hill & Jörg Mezel eds., 2008) (noting the "marginal place of the highest law of the land in political discourse, which has, on occasion been unfortunately replicated in the judicial arena").
169. See generally, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 106 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2007).
170. See Eastman v The Queen (2000) '203 CLR 1, 44 (Austl.) (observing that "most Australian judges have been in substance what Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court once called himself-A faint-hearted originalist").
171. Anthony Mason, The Australian Constitution in Retrospect and Prospect, in REFLECTIONS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 7,8 (Robert French et al. eds., 2003).
172. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles, 3 U. III. L. REV. 683, 686 (2012).
173. See Stephen Donaghue, The Clamour of Silent Constitutional Principles, 24 FED. L. REV. 133,146, n.87 (1996) (referencing a poll conducted by Irving Saulwick).
174. Adam A. Perlin, What Makes Originalism Original?: A Comparative Analysis of Originalism and Its Role in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence in the United States and Australia, 23 UCLAPAC. BASIN LJ. 94, 95 (2005) (noting that "[fjoo often, American scholars have viewed originalism through an American prism that inevitably leads to the conclusion that American originalism must be the only originalism").
175. Philip Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 94 (1984).
176. Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 79, 80
177. (2010); see also Robert C. Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 29 (1990) (characterizing historical arguments that claim that the Framers speak for present generations as "neither more nor less than a characterization of the national ethos").
178. See Carolyn Evans, Constitutional Narratives: Constitutional Adjudication on the Religion Clauses in Australia and Malaysia, li EMORY INT'L L. REV. 437, 438 (2009) ("Constitutional narrative in this context is a culturally and legally created story about the role, purpose, history, and relevance of the constitution in a particular society.").
179. see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,319-36 (2007).
180. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,2788, 2790-2801,2804-05 (2008) (Scalia, J., majority opinion);
181. See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 H.ARV. L. REV. 1231, 1250 (1994) ("[0]riginalist interpretivism is not simply one method of interpretation among many-it is the only method that is suited to discovering the actual meaning of the relevant text");
182. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism's Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 544 (1998) ("When we accept some text as law, we also commit to the law's original meanings . Indeed, to embrace the legitimacy of words as law without their original, ordinary meanings is to embrace nothing.").
183. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE LJ. 1225,1285 (1999).
184. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Orginalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 601 (2004) (noting that "originalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts");
185. Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "ism," 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 302, 304 (1995).
186. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (And How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2062 (2006) (arguing that the "existence of reasonably firm criteria makes it easier to check up on originalist interpretations for the soundness of their reasoning and their adherence to correct principles" whereas "[n]onoriginalism, on the other hand, means never having to say you're sorry").
187. The Rush Limbaugh Show, It's Not All About Roe v. Wade (Oct. 11, 2005), transcript available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2005/10/ll/it-s-not- all-about-roe-v-wade.
188. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 385 (2000) (arguing that Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of original meaning is "one that Justice Scalia uses selectively when it leads to the conservative results he wants, but ignores when it does not generate the outcomes he desires");
189. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 437 (1995);
190. Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217 (2004).
191. See, e.g., David Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137 (2011);
192. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005).
193. Indeed, Balkin acknowledges that despite the immense preoccupation with originalism in United States discourse, "it is not even the dominant form of argument among American judges" and that cases decided primarily through originalist methods, like Heller and McDonald, are rare. Jack Balkin, The American Constitution as "Our Law, " 25 YALE J.L.& HUMAN. 113,124(2013).
194. See Che Omar Bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MALAYAN. LJ. 55, 56;
195. Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi Pasir Mas (Susie Teoh), (1990) 2 MALAYAN LJ. 300, 301;
196. Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v. Fatimah bte Sihi, (2000) 5 MALAYAN LJ. 375, 384F;
197. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, (2004) 2 MALAYAN LJ. 119 (H.C.), at 129 [18];
198. Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, (2007) 3 ALL MALAY. REP. 585 (F.C.), at 3;
199. Lee Kwan Woh v. Pub. Prosecutor, (2009) 5 MALAYAN L J. 301; 311.
200. Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2012).
201. ("From 1986 to 2002, according to Professor Melvyn Durchslag, the Supreme Court referenced The Federalist in forty-two percent more cases (ninety-eight cases) than during the preceding sixteen years, with Justice Scalia writing nearly one-fifth of those opinions.") (citing Melvyn R. Durchslag,. The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here Than Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 295, 297 (2005));
202. ("The Federalist was cited more often in the nineteen years from 1980 to 1998 than in the eighty previous years combined.") (citing Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324,1328 (1998)).
203. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641,653 (2013).
204. See Brownlee v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 278,285 (Austl).
205. Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252, 277 (Austl.).