Constitutional amendment rules: The denominator problem

Comparative Constitutional Design

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 195-218

  Dixon, Rosalind ^a   Holden, Richard ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84920158944     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139105712.011     Document Type: Chapter

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