The Red King effect: When the slowest runner wins the coevolutionary race

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 593-598

  Bergstrom, Carl T ^a   Lachmann, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICS IN THE SCIENCES   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; EQUILIBRIUM CONSTANT; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MOLECULAR BIOLOGY; MOLECULAR DYNAMICS; MOLECULAR EVOLUTION; MOLECULAR MECHANICS; POPULATION GENETICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SYMBIOSIS; THEORY;

ANIMALS; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DYNAMICS;

EID: 0037457889     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0134966100     Document Type: Article

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