Erratum: Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything (Nature Communications (2013) 4:2193 DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3193);Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything

Nature Communications

Volumn 4, Issue , 2013, Pages

  Adami, Christoph ^a,b   Hintze, Arend ^b  

^a Michigan State University ^*  (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY; PRISONER DILEMMA; RECOGNITION;

ARTICLE; PROBABILITY; PROCESS DESIGN; ZERO DETERMINANT STRATEGY;

EID: 84881322700     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20411723     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms4764     Document Type: Erratum

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