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Volumn 110, Issue 25, 2013, Pages 10229-10233

Fusing enacted and expected mimicry generates a winning strategy that promotes the evolution of cooperation

Author keywords

Conflict resolution; Prisoner's dilemma; SERS; TFT; WSLS

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; CONFLICT; COOPERATION; HUMAN; LEARNING ALGORITHM; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PRISONER; REINFORCEMENT; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED RELATIVE SIMILARITY; TIT FOR TAT; WIN STAY LOSE SHIFT; WORKING MEMORY;

EID: 84879314902     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1308221110     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (36)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.