Rationality in an uncertain world: Essays in the cognitive science of human understanding

Rationality in an Uncertain World: Essays In the Cognitive Science of Human Understanding

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-345

  Chater, Nick ^a   Oaksford, Mike ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WALES   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85068672361     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203345955     Document Type: Book

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