The evidential support theory of conditionals

Synthese

Volumn 164, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 19-44

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Bayesian epistemology; Conditionals; Probability; Semantics

Indexed keywords

EID: 48349090630     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9214-5     Document Type: Article

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