The truth about conditionals

The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St B.T. Evans

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 119-143

  Johnson Laird, Philip N ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84909631633     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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