Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 1021-1028

  Guo, Mingyu ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

Comparing and improving redistribution mechanisms; Mechanism design; Payment redistribution; Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanism

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MACHINE DESIGN;

INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; OTHER PROPERTIES; PAYMENT REDISTRIBUTION; REPEATED APPLICATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM; VCG MECHANISM; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899981948     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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