Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 1029-1036

  Guo, Mingyu ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Payment redistribution; Prior distributions over preferences; Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanism

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; RESOURCE VALUATION;

ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTIPLE RESOURCES; OPTIMAL DISCRETIZATION; PAYMENT REDISTRIBUTION; PRIOR DISTRIBUTION; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 84899927213     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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