Ties matter: Complexity of voting manipulation revisited

10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011

Volumn 1, Issue , 2011, Pages 65-72

  Obraztsova, Svetlana ^a   Elkind, Edith ^a   Hazon, Noam ^b  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Complexity; Manipulation; Tie breaking rules; Voting

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MANIPULATORS;

ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHMS; COMPLEXITY; DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; MANIPULATION; PROBLEM COMPLEXITY; THEORY OF COMPUTATION; TIE-BREAKING; VOTING;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899450147     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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