Security games with surveillance cost and optimal timing of attack execution

12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013

Volumn 1, Issue , 2013, Pages 223-230

  An, Bo ^a   Brown, Matthew ^b   Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy ^c   Tambe, Milind ^c  

^a INSTITUTE OF COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES   (United States)

Author keywords

Game Theory; Optimization; Security; Stackelberg Games

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COSTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION; DEPLOYED APPLICATIONS; FINITE STATE SPACES; MATHEMATICAL PROGRAM; OPTIMAL STOPPING PROBLEM; RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGIES; SECURITY; STACKELBERG GAMES;

MONITORING;

EID: 84899427474     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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