Risk-averse strategies for security games with execution and observational uncertainty

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2011, Pages 758-763

  Yin, Zhengyu ^a   Jain, Manish ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Ordóñez, Fernando ^a,b  

^a University of Southern California   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MIXED STRATEGY; NOVEL ALGORITHM; SOLUTION APPROACH; STACKELBERG GAMES;

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 80055033132     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

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