PROTECT: A deployed game theoretic system to protect the ports of the United States

11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2012, AAMAS 2012: Innovative Applications Track

Volumn 1, Issue , 2012, Pages 1-8

  Shieh, Eric ^a   An, Bo ^a   Yang, Rong ^a   Tambe, Milind ^a   Baldwin, Craig ^b   DiRenzo, Joseph ^b   Maule, Ben ^b   Meyer, Garrett ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b United States Coast Guard ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Applications; Game Theory; Security; Stackelberg Games

Indexed keywords

APPLICATIONS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

COMPACT REPRESENTATION; DEPLOYED APPLICATIONS; QUANTAL RESPONSE; SECURITY; SECURITY APPLICATION; STACKELBERG GAMES; STRATEGY SPACE; UNITED STATES COAST GUARD;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84899424114     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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