Complexity of computing optimal Stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 805-810

  Korzhyk, Dmytro ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Parr, Ronald ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER GAMES; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EXPONENTIAL NUMBERS; LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS; MULTIPLE RESOURCES; MULTIPLE TARGETS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; SECURITY APPLICATION; SECURITY PERSONNEL; STACKELBERG MODEL;

AIRPORT SECURITY;

EID: 77958598366     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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