Federalism as the new nationalism: An overview

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 123, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 1888-1918

  Gerken, Heather K ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84898632746     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (334)

1. Symposium, Federalism All the Way Down, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
2. Symposium, Progressive Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2009)
3. Symposium, Federalism and Climate Change: The Role of the States in a Future Federal Regime, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 673 (2008)
4. Symposium, The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007)
5. Symposium, Interactive Federalism: Filling the Gaps?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006).
6. Emily Bazelon, States' Rights Are for Liberals, ATLANTIC, June 19, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/07/states-rights-are-for-liberals/309388.
7. As opposed to the old "new federalism," the term used to describe the Rehnquist Court's efforts to reintroduce limits on national power.
8. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 285 (2005).
9. Ernie Young, for instance, is likely to demand a formal apology for suggesting that he inspired any of this work.
10. Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044-2050 (2014).
11. Abbe Gluck offers a different formulation: if we live in the age of federal statutes, what is the continuing relevance of states?
12. Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014).
13. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1-52 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
14. That is true even when they also advance federalism's traditional aims. Gluck, in particular, has emphasized that these arrangements further ends associated with both nationalism and traditional federalism.
15. Gluck, supra note 6.
16. Or, if we look to LaCroix's historical work, a well-functioning federal republic.
17. Alison L. Lacroix, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 6 (2010).
18. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 550 (2011) (suggesting that "most of the existing federalism literature has considered federalism from the perspective of states").
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004).
20. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663-699 (2001).
21. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is the Fostering of Competition the Point of American Constitutional Federalism?, 48 TULSA L. REV. 339-353 (2012) (reviewing MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012)).
22. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997) (analyzing our failure to offer a full account of the reasons for valuing federalism).
23. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 44-72 (2010).
24. Gluck, supra note 10.
25. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920-1923 (2014).
26. Gluck, supra note 6, 1998.
27. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Federalism and National Consensus 4-5 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
28. Gerken, supra note 13, at 44-72.
29. LaCroix, supra note 6, at 2093.
30. As LaCroix has shown, the history of federalism is a history of contestation over these and other categories, including sovereignty, jurisdiction, and union.
31. Lacroix, supra note 9.
32. Gluck, supra note 6.
33. Gerken, supra note 13, at 11-18.
34. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15.
35. Gerken, supra note 13, at 11-18.
36. Gluck, supra note 6.
37. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014).
38. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero-Sum Game, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4 (2012).
39. La Croix, supra note 6, at 2046-50.
40. Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013).
41. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014).
42. Gerken, supra note 13, at 33-44.
43. Rodríguez, supra note 16.
44. Gluck, supra note 6.
45. Id. at 1997.
46. Heather K. Gerken, The Federalis(m) Society, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 942 (2013).
47. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013).
48. Gluck, in her effort to provoke, teeters on the edge of making this claim. Gluck, supra note 6. Rodríguez is more skeptical she emphasizes the ways in which states operate independently of the federal government and thus serve the interests of discrete communities.
49. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2114-19.
50. Heather K. Gerken, Abandoning Bad Ideas and Disregarding Good Ones for the Right Reasons: Reflections on a Festschrift, 48 TULSA L. REV. 536-37 (2013).
51. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 4).
52. We write in good company. Judith Resnik, for instance, has done important work on the way that "translocal organizations of governmental actors" pursue international law projects and foreign policy aims, thereby serving "national, not federal" interests.
53. Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31-34 (2007).
54. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564-1581 (2006).
55. Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008).
56. Theodore W. Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concurrency and Its Implications for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1047-48 (2006).
57. Emily Zackin, What's Happened to American Federalism?, 43 POLITY 388 (2011).
58. David L. Shapiro, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
59. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
60. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
61. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
62. Gerken, supra note 22.
63. Gerken, supra note 13.
64. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005).
65. Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958 (2014).
66. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31.
67. Gerken, supra note 13, at 10.
68. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567-568 (2008).
69. Rodríguez, supra note 16.
70. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2100.
71. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 5).
72. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2127-28.
73. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 3).
74. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 31, at 1171-79.
75. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 46-48).
76. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31.
77. Heather K. Gerken & Charles Tyler, The Myth of the Laboratories of Democracy (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
78. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 20-22).
79. Miriam Seifert, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
80. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
81. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1081.
82. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1922-23, 1946.
83. Gluck, supra note 6, at 1997.
84. Gluck, supra note 10, at 573.
85. Gluck, supra note 10.
86. Indeed, her work shows that it even served as a site of contestation between the imperial center and the colonial periphery prior to the Founding.
87. Lacroix, supra note 9.
88. Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733-746 (2011) (describing federalism in the Founding era as a rejection of Blackstone's specter of imperium in imperio, or a sovereign within a sovereign).
89. id. at 758-59 (describing how the federalism of the Founding era rejected the "theory that sovereignty could be divided along subject-matter lines, lines that would in turn be policed by an institution with a special mandate to monitor these boundaries").
90. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2220-23 (1998) (arguing that states may be useful because their borders do not coincide with racial or religious divides).
91. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23.
92. Id. While conventional federalism has looked for forms of state identification in which each state is exceptional, Bulman-Pozen argues that it is "the unexceptional-the ways in which states and the federal government occupy the same political space-that generates today's state-based identification."
93. Id. at 1130.
94. Id. at 1078.
95. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1922.
96. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, supra note 31.
97. Gerken, supra note 13, at 44-71.
98. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 31, at 1142-59.
99. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31, at 1747.
100. Gerken, supra note 13, at 52-58.
101. Id. at 44-71.
102. Rodríguez, supra note 34.
103. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 10).
104. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2100.
105. id. at 2119-21.
106. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 10).
107. Rodríguez, supra note 16.
108. For a different but equally distinctive take on the participatory benefits of decentralization
109. Ruger, supra note 30, at 1047-48.
110. Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 206-07, 210, 215 (2012) [hereinafter LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction].
111. LaCroix, supra note 45, at 750 (challenging arguments that popular sovereignty was the sole cause of federalism's development and noting that "it is ... difficult to exaggerate the importance of the judiciary for the creation of American federalism").
112. Alison L. LaCroix, What if Madison Had Won? Imagining a Constitutional World of Legislative Supremacy, 45 IND. L. REV. 41 (2011) (considering what would have happened had the Constitutional Convention adopted Madison's proposal to give Congress the power to negative state law in lieu of judicial review).
113. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 65, at 206-07, 210-215.
114. Gluck, supra note 10.
115. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011).
116. Gluck, supra note 10.
117. Gluck, supra note 6.
118. Gerken, supra note 13, at 60-71.
119. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23.
120. Gluck, supra note 6, at 2019-21.
121. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2101-03.
122. Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 39).
123. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 5).
124. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Integrated Regime of Immigration Regulation, in WRITING IMMIGRATION: SCHOLARS AND JOURNALISTS IN DIALOGUE 44-53 (Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco et al. eds., 2011) (arguing that "no amount of federal action will flatten out the underlying differences in public opinion" in the immigration context).
125. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 33).
126. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 31, at 1171-79 (discussing the benefits of cycling).
127. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2100.
128. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 62).
129. Gluck, supra note 6, at 2021-22.
130. Id. at 2022.
131. LACROIX, supra note 9, at 220-21 (suggesting that "the federal ideal" is "an intellectual artifact, not a transcendent or timeless idea that has always hovered around waiting to be applied to a particular political project").
132. LaCroix, supra note 6, at 2045 (suggesting that the only real consensus about federalism is that we disagree about it).
133. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
134. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
135. Gerken & Tyler, supra note 39.
136. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008).
137. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
138. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1124-29 (arguing that the states are "laboratories of partisan politics").
139. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 97-98 (2009).
140. Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
141. Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006).
142. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, but as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219 (1997).
143. Chemerinsky, supra note 11.
144. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2011).
145. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (2011).
146. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1719-20 (2010).
147. Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377 (2006).
148. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012).
149. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001).
150. Rick Hills, as is his wont, has developed his own, distinctively Hillsian account of why "federalism can improve the national legislative process."
151. Roderick M. Hills, Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1-4 (2007).
152. Roderick M. Hills, Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (1998).
153. Erin Ryan, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012).
154. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008).
155. William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1997).
156. William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007).
157. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009).
158. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995).
159. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006).
160. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
161. Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 30 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
162. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002).
163. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
164. Gerken, supra note 13, at 20 (contrasting accounts of cooperative federalism that resemble conventional arguments about states serving as "laboratories of democracy, sources of innovation, and regulatory rivals" with the Foreword, which "limn[s] the theories that make up the other half of [conventional] federalism-those that emphasize the role that minority rule plays in shaping identity, promoting democracy, and diffusing power" (footnotes omitted)).
165. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 26.
166. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, supra note 31, at 1981.
167. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 26.
168. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
169. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
170. For an excellent survey of this work and an important contribution to it
171. Jon D. Michaels, Dynamic Separation of Powers (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
172. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2012).
173. Id. at 461.
174. Id. at 493-96.
175. Id. at 486-88, 498-500.
176. Gluck, supra note 6, at 2019.
177. Id. at 2020.
178. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2113.
179. Rodríguez, supra note 34, at 630-40.
180. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire- Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005).
181. Gluck, supra note 10, at 564.
182. Id. at 538, 569, 572-74.
183. Id. at 574.
184. Id. at 565.
185. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2100.
186. Id. at 2108-09.
187. Id. at 2111.
188. Ken Shepsle, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
189. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).
190. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 71, at 45-46 (arguing that the idea of state equality is belied by facts on the ground).
191. Adelman & Engel, supra note 86, at 1822 (arguing that given the wide variability among the states, "the state-federal debate ought to be a sideshow").
192. Carlson, note 86, at 1099-1100, 1107, 1160 (discussing the "superregulator" status of certain states in environmental law).
193. This might be one way to characterize Bulman-Pozen's work on partisan federalism, which focuses on the partisan identity of states rather than states as states.
194. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23.
195. Rodríguez has emphasized the internal diversity of states, which manifests itself not only in state-federal relations but in the differences among state administrators.
196. Rodríguez, supra note 34, at 585-90, 636-40.
197. Roderick M. Hills, Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999).
198. Like Hills, Judith Resnik has been a leading figure in this debate, as much of her work is devoted to "[m]ultifaceted federalism," which "presumes that governance cannot accurately be described as residing at a single site."
199. Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619-623 (2001).
200. We see this move being made in many areas, from policing, see Richman, supra note 85, to environmental law, see sources cited supra note 86.
201. Not to be confused with the work on "administrative federalism," which focuses on the role agencies play in limiting or expanding state power. See infra note 133 (collecting sources).
202. In her view, "federalism now comes from federal statutes ... . [F]ederalism's primary source is Congress."
203. Gluck, supra note 6, at 1998. As such, federalism "comes-and goes-at Congress's pleasure."
204. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
205. Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006).
206. Gerken, supra note 13, at 33-43.
207. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 31.
208. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 93.
209. Gluck, supra note 10.
210. Rodríguez, supra note 34, at 571.
211. Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison's Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 457-58 (2010).
212. Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution and the Spending Power 3-4 (Univ. of Chi., Working Paper No. 420, 2013).
213. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
214. Hills, Federalism in Constitutional Context, supra note 85, at 191 (1998).
215. Gluck, supra note 68.
216. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 65, at 206-07, 210, 215.
217. Id. at 206.
218. Alison L. LaCroix, The Constitution of the Second Generation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775-1786 (describing the nineteenth century as "an unparalleled site for exploring the transmission of the Constitution, both written and unwritten").
219. Rodríguez, supra note 34.
220. Gluck, supra note 26.
221. Theodore W. Ruger, Health Care Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S Huberfeld, With Liberty and Access for Some: The ACA's Disconnect for Women's Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357 (2013).
222. Richman, supra note 85.
223. Another example of efforts to "dissect" the national government is the work done on "administrative federalism," which focuses on the role that federal agencies play in influencing state-federal relations.
224. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111 (2008).
225. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008).
226. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004).
227. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008).
228. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009).
229. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23.
230. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1934.
231. Rick Hills is one of the most astute commentators making the reverse move, examining what happens when Congress "dissect[s] the state, unpacking the black box of 'the state' to liberate certain state or local institutions from control of state laws."
232. Hills, supra note 113, at 1203.
233. Roderick M. Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 877-78 (1998).
234. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2101, 2103-04, 2110, 2112-13.
235. Gerken, supra note 13, at 21-33.
236. Rick Hills has also grouped subnational institutions within federalism's ambit.
237. Hills, supra note 113.
238. Roderick M. Hills, Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 187-88 (2005).
239. Others have written on the relationship between the local and the national, albeit not in the terms I describe here.
240. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487-91 (1999).
241. Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1 (2006).
242. Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1313-15 (1994).
243. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 990-1000 (2007).
244. Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 208-09 (1996).
245. Resnik, supra note 113, at 621-23.
246. Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542-2563 (2006).
247. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1811-13 (2004).
248. Rodríguez, supra note 34.
249. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2115 & n.52.
250. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2097.
251. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687 (2006).
252. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2115 & n.52.
253. Judith Resnik has written extensively on federalism's horizontal and even "diagonal" dimensions, see sources cited supra note 30, and Susan Rose-Ackerman has written a seminal paper on interstate competition
254. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 82.
255. Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 966-72 (2001).
256. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 117-126 (2001).
257. Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008).
258. Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007).
259. Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (2010).
260. Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1105-08 (2010).
261. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 71.
262. Gerken & Tyler, supra note 39.
263. Rodríguez, supra note 16 (manuscript at 25-26).
264. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1126.
265. Id. at 1108-34.
266. Id. at 1135-42.
267. Gluck, supra note 10, at 570-71.
268. Gluck, supra note 6, at 2021-22.
269. Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 72, 82-85 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/december12/forum_985.php (criticizing the Madisonian model in the context of separation of powers).
270. Gerken, supra note 13, at 17-18 (surveying this debate).
271. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1108-13 (surveying this debate). Leading the charge has been Ernie Young, on the one hand, and Malcolm Feeley and Ed Rubin on the other.
272. Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? Sovereignty and Political Community in Europe and the United States 14-15 (Summer 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that states have distinct identities), with
273. Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37 (2001) (taking the opposite view)
274. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 944 (1994) (same).
275. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23, at 1108-21.
276. Id. at 1082.
277. Id. at 1096 ("While the specifics of the arrangements are mutable, the fact that states exist as separate sites of governance means political conflict will be channeled through them.").
278. Along with our colleague, Judith Resnik. See sources cited supra note 30.
279. Gerken, supra note 13, at 14.
280. Gluck's position on this question is more ambivalent. She agrees that the new federalism "lacks the traditional appearances of federalism's defining feature-sovereignty," but wants federalism scholars to reimagine sovereignty so that they can see, as Gluck does, that "federalism depends on, and strengthens, the state's continuing sovereign status in important ways."
281. Gluck, supra note 6, at 1999, 2000.
282. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
283. Gerken, supra note 117.
284. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 31.
285. Gluck, supra note 6, at 1998.
286. Rodríguez, supra note 34.
287. LaCroix, supra note 18. Her work thus challenges much of the doctrine and scholarship that relies on originalist modes of interpretation and portrays federalism as static.
288. Gerken, supra note 13, at 11-20.
289. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
290. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 31.
291. Gerken, supra note 117.
292. Gluck, supra note 6.
293. Gluck, supra note 10.
294. Gluck, supra note 26.
295. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15.
296. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 23.
297. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, supra note 31.
298. Gerken, supra note 13.
299. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31.
300. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 31.
301. Rodríguez, supra note 16.
302. Rodríguez, supra note 34.
303. Rodríguez, supra note 21.
304. Gluck, supra note 6.
305. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2013) (arguing that different forms of state power-sovereignty, autonomy, and agency-complement and reinforce one another).
306. I use this line in Gerken, supra note 168, at 1550, where I issue a formal apology to Tolkien.
307. Judith Resnik has long written about "federalism(s)." Her recent Nomos piece describes a dizzying array: "administrative federalism, cooperative federalism, competitive federalism, creative federalism, cultural federalism, dialectical federalism, dialogical federalism, dual federalism, fiscal federalism, intrastatutory federalism, noncategorical federalism, polyphonic federalism, territorial federalism, and the like." And she has long been "hesitant to assume that any one of them provides a stable and general account."
308. Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)'s Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (James Fleming ed.) (forthcoming 2014).
309. Gerken, supra note 168.
310. Here again, the environmental federalists are some of the dominant figures in developing these sorts of accounts, see sources cited supra note 86, although we see similar arguments in other areas as well, see sources cited supra notes 84-85. Virtually all of Judith Resnik's work, for example, describes federal-state relations in this fashion.
311. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 31.
312. Ryan, supra note 86.
313. Schapiro, supra note 84.
314. Engel, supra note 86.
315. Carlson, supra note 86.
316. LaCroix, supra note 6, at 2049.
317. Id. at 2052.
318. Schapiro, supra note 4, at 285.
319. Gluck, supra note 6, at 1997.
320. Ryan, supra note 86.
321. Erin Ryan, Environmental Law After Sebelius: Will the Court's New Spending Power Limits Affect Environmental State-Federal Partnerships?, AM. CONST. SOC'Y (2013), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Ryan-_After_Sebelius.pdf.
322. Ming H. Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism: Toward a Doctrinal Framework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
323. Weiser, supra note 183.
324. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15.
325. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, supra note 31.
326. Gluck, supra note 10, at 538.
327. Rodríguez, supra note 34, at 573.
328. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, supra note 31, at 1967.
329. Gerken, supra note 28, at 549-50.
330. Gluck, supra note 6, at 2000 (arguing that "[n]on-dualist models of federalism have always suffered from a 'wishy-washiness' problem when it comes to law").
331. Rodríguez, supra note 21, at 2098 (noting that work on the new federalism makes it "difficult to move from describing the functions federalism performs in different domains to an overarching normative structural theory").
332. Gluck, supra note 6, at 2022-43.
333. LaCroix, supra note 6, at 2061.
334. Id. at 2087.