The role of GP's compensation schemes in diabetes care: Evidence from panel data

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 104-120

  Iezzi, Elisa ^a   Lippi Bruni, Matteo ^a   Ugolini, Cristina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Avoidable hospitalisations; Diabetes; Health economics; Primary care

Indexed keywords

DIABETES MELLITUS, TYPE 2; ECONOMICS; FEMALE; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HOSPITALIZATION; HUMAN; ITALY; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; REIMBURSEMENT; STANDARDS; STATISTICS AND NUMERICAL DATA;

DIABETES MELLITUS, TYPE 2; FEMALE; GENERAL PRACTITIONERS; HOSPITALIZATION; HUMANS; ITALY; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE;

EID: 84893524614     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.01.002     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. ADA Clinical Practice Recommendations Hyperglycaemic crisis in patients with diabetes mellitus. Diabetes Care 2002, 25(Suppl. 1):S100-S108.
2. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Guide to Prevention Quality Indicators: Hospital Admission for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions 2007, http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/.
3. Andersen L.B. What determines the behaviour and performance of health professionals?. International Review of Administrative Sciences 2009, 75:79-97.
4. Baltagi B.H., Bresson G., Pirotte A. Fixed effects, random effects or Hausman-Taylor? A pretest estimator. Economics Letters 2003, 79:361-369.
5. Basu J., Mobley L.R. Do HMOs reduce preventable hospitalizations for Medicare beneficiaries?. Medical Care Research and Review 2007, 64(5):544-547.
6. Benabou R., Tirole J. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of Economic Studies 2003, 70(3):489-520.
7. Billings J., Zeitel L., Lukomnik J., et al. Impact of socioeconomic status on hospital use in New York City. Health Affairs 1993, 12:162-173.
8. Birkmeier N.J., Birkmeier J.D. Strategies for improving surgical quality - should payers reward excellence or effort?. New England Journal of Medicine 2006, 354(8):864-870.
9. Booth G.L., Fang J. Acute complications of diabetes. Diabetes in Ontario: An ICES Practice Atlas 2003, ICES, Ontario. J. Hux, G. Booth, P. Slaughter, A. Laupacis (Eds.).
10. Buetow S. Pay-for-performance in New Zealand primary health care. Journal of Health Organization and Management 2008, 22(1):3-47.
11. Burgess S., Ratto M. The role of incentives in the public sector: issues and evidence. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2003, 19(2):285-300.
12. Campbell S.M., McDonald R., Lester H. The experience of pay for performance in English family practice: a qualitative study. Annals of Family Medicine 2008, 6:228-234.
13. Campbell S.M., Reeves D., Kontopantelis E., Sibbald B., Roland M. Effects of pay for performance on the quality of primary care in England. New England Journal of Medicine 2009, 361:368-378.
14. Cashin C. New Zealand: Primary Health Organization (PHO) Performance Program, Major Developments in Results-Based Financing (RBF) in OECD Countries: Country Summaries and Mapping of RBF Programs 2011, World Bank, Washington DC., USA.
15. Conrad D.A., Perry L. Quality-based financial incentives in health care: Can we improve quality by paying for it?. Annual Review of Public Health 2009, 30:357-371.
16. Chen J.Y., Tian H., Taira Juarez D., Hodges K.A., Brand J.C., Chung R.S., Legorreta A.P. The effect of a PPO pay-for-performance program on patients with diabetes. American Journal Managed Care 2010, 16(1):e11-e19.
17. Christianson J., Sutherland K., Leatherman S. Financial Incentives, Healthcare Providers and Quality Improvements: A Review of the Evidence 2009, QQUIP, The Health Foundation, London.
18. Doran T., Kontopantelis E., Valderas J., Campbell S., Roland M., Salisbury C., Reeves D. Effect of financial incentives on incentivised and non-incentivised clinical activities: longitudinal analysis of data from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework. BMJ 2011, 342:d3590.
19. Dumont E., Fortin B., Jacquemet N., Shearer B. Physicians' multitasking and incentives: empirical evidence from a natural experiment. Journal of Health Economics 2008, 27:1436-1450.
20. Dusheiko M., Gravelle H., Martin S., Rice N., Smith P.C. Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs? Evidence from English primary care. Journal of Health Economics 2011, 30(5):919-932.
21. Eggleston K. Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment. Journal of Health Economics 2005, 24(1):211-223.
22. Eijkenaar F. Pay for performance in health care: an international overview of the initiatives. Medical Care Research and Review 2012, 69(3):251-276.
23. Eijkenaar F. Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs. European Journal Health Economics 2013, 14:117-131.
24. Emmert M., Eijkenaar F., Kemter H., Esslinger A.S., Schöffski O. Economic evaluation of pay-for-performance in health care: a systematic review. European Journal Health Economics 2012, 13:755-767.
25. Fiorentini G., Iezzi E., Lippi Bruni M., Ugolini C. Incentives in primary care and their impact on potentially avoidable hospital admissions. European Journal of Health Economics 2011, 2(4):297-309.
26. Fiorentini G., Lippi Bruni M., Ugolini C. GPs and hospital expenditures. Shall we keep expenditure containment programs alive?. Social Science & Medicine 2013, 82:10-20.
27. Fleming D.M. The prevalence of known diabetes in eight European countries. European Journal of Public Health 2004, 14:10-14.
28. Glasziou P.P., Buchan H., Del Mar C., et al. When financial incentives do more good than harm: a checklist. BMJ 2012, 13(345):e5047.
29. Gneezy U., Rustichini A. Pay enough or don't pay at all. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2000, 115:791-810.
30. Goddard M., Mannion R., Smith P. Enhancing performance in health care: a theoretical perspective on agency and the role of information. Health Economics 2000, 9:95-107.
31. Gravelle H., Sutton M., Ma A. Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance contract: treating, cheating and case finding?. Economic Journal 2010, 120:F129-F156.
32. ® in Econometrics 2007, 1:113-218.
33. Greene J. An examination of pay-for-performance in general practice in Australia. Health Services Research 2013, (in press). 10.1111/1475-6773.12033.
34. Hausman J.A., Taylor W.E. Panel data and unobservable individual effects. Econometrica 1981, 49:1377-1398.
35. Hausman J.A., Hall B.H., Griliches Z. Econometric models for count data with an application to the patents-R&D relationship. Econometrica 1984, 52:909-938.
36. Hilbe J.M. Negative Binomial Regression 2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
37. Hilbe J.M., Greene W.H. Count response regression models. Handbook of Statistics 2008, vol. 27. Elsevier BV, (Chapter 7).
38. Imbens G., Wooldridge J. Recent development in the econometrics of program evaluations. Journal of Economic Literature 2009, 47(1):5-86.
39. Jones A.M. Panel data methods and application to health economics. Applied Econometrics 2009, vol. II. Palgrave MacMillian, Basingstoke. T.C. Mills, K. Patterson (Eds.).
40. Kann I.G., Biørn E., Luras H. Competition in general practice: prescription to the elderly in a list patient system. Journal of Health Economics 2010, 29:751-764.
41. Kantarevic J., Kralj B. Link between pay for performance incentives and physician payment mechanisms: evidence form the Diabetes Management Incentive in Ontario. Health Economics 2012, (in press). 10.1002/hec.2890.
42. Kaarboe O., Siciliani L. Multi-tasking, quality and pay for performance. Health Economics 2011, 20:225-238.
43. Kontopantelis E., et al. Recorded quality of primary care for patients with diabetes in England before and after the introduction of a financial incentive scheme: a longitudinal observational study. BMJ Quality and Safety 2013, 22(1):53-54.
44. Kuo R.N., Chung K.P., Lai M.S. Effect of the pay-for-performance program for breast cancer care in Taiwan. American Journal of Managed Care 2011, 1(17):e203-e211.
45. Lai C.-L., Hou Y.-H. The association of clinical guideline adherence and pay-for-performance among patients with diabetes. Journal of the Chinese Medical Association 2013, 76(2):102-107.
46. Lee T.T., Cheng S.H., Chen C.C., Lai M.S. A pay-for-performance program for diabetes care in Taiwan: a preliminary assessment. American Journal Managed Care 2010, 16(1):65-69.
47. Le Grand J. Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: of Knights and Knave, Pawns and Queen 2003, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
48. Li Y.H., Tsai W.C., Khan M., et al. The effects of pay-for-performance on tuberculosis treatment in Taiwan. Health Policy and Planning 2010, 25(4):334-341.
49. Lippi Bruni M., Nobilio L., Ugolini C. Economic incentives in general practice: the impact of pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance programs on diabetes care. Health Policy 2009, 90(2/3):140-148.
50. Mannion R., Goddard M., Bate A. Aligning incentives and motivations in health care: the case of earned autonomy. Financial Accountability & Management 2007, 23(4):401-420.
51. McDonald R., Harrison S., Checkland K. Incentives and control in primary health care: findings from English pay-for-performance case studies. Journal of Health Organization and Management 2008, 22:48-62.
52. Monesi, et al. Prevalence, incidence and mortality of diagnosed diabetes: evidence from an Italian population-based study. Diabetic Medicine 2012, 29(August (8)):1085-1086.
53. Mullen K.J., Frank R.G., Rosenthal M.B. Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers. Rand Journal of Economics 2010, 41(1):64-91.
54. Purdy S., Griffin T., Salisbury C., Sharp D. Ambulatory care sensitive conditions: terminology and disease coding need to be more specific to aid policy makers and clinicians. Public Health 2009, 123(2):169-173.
55. RACGP (Royal Australian College of General Practitioners) Diabetes Management in General Practice 2009, RACGP, Melbourne, Australia. 15th ed.
56. Scott A., Schurer S., Jensen P.H., Sivey P. The effects of an incentive program on quality of care in diabetes management. Health Economics 2009, 18(9):1091-1108.
57. Scott A., Sivey P., Ait Ouakrim D., Willenberg L., Naccarella L., Furler J., Young D. The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians. Cochrane Database of Systematic Review 2011, (9). http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD008451.pub2/pdf.
58. Siciliani L. Paying for performance and motivation crowding out. Economic Letters 2009, 103:8-71.
59. Smith P. Measuring health system performance. European Journal of Health Economics 2002, 3:145-148.
60. Sutton M., Elder R., Guthrie B., Watt G. Record rewards: the effects of targeted quality incentives on the recording of risk factors by primary care providers. Health Economics 2010, 19:1-13.
61. Van Herck P., De Smedt D., Annemans L., et al. Systematic review: effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health care. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:247-250.
62. Vuong Q. Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypothesis. Econometrica 1989, 57:307-344.
63. Whalley D., Gravelle H., Sibbald B. Effect of the new contract on GPs' working lives and perceptions of quality of care: a longitudinal survey. British Journal of General Practice 2008, 58:8-14.
64. Wilson K.J. Pay-for-performance in health care: what can we learn from international experience. Quality Management in Health Care 2013, 22(1):2-15.
65. Young G.J., Meterko M., Beckman H., et al. Effects of paying physicians based on their relative performance for quality. General Internal Medicine 2007, 22:872-876.