Physicians' multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1436-1450

  Dumont, Etienne ^a   Fortin, Bernard ^a   Jacquemet, Nicolas ^b   Shearer, Bruce ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

Incentive contracts; Labour supply; Mixed payment systems; Multitasking; Physician payment mechanisms

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; HEALTH EXPENDITURE; HEALTH POLICY; HEALTH SERVICES; HEALTH WORKER; INCENTIVE; LABOR SUPPLY; TEACHING;

ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH SERVICE; HUMAN; MAJOR CLINICAL STUDY; MALE; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; TASK PERFORMANCE; WORK CAPACITY;

EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE SURVEYS; HUMANS; MALE; NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; QUEBEC; SPECIALTIES, MEDICAL;

CANADA; NORTH AMERICA; QUEBEC [CANADA];

EID: 55149083118     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.07.010     Document Type: Article

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