Multi-tasking, quality and pay for performance

Health Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 225-238

  Kaarboe, Oddvar ^a,b   Siciliani, Luigi ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

^b Health Economics Bergen (HEB)   (Norway)

^c UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

^d CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Altruism; Pay for performance; Quality

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH SERVICE; HUMAN; MANAGEMENT; MEDICAL FEE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ALTRUISM; ECONOMICS, HOSPITAL; HEALTH PERSONNEL; HUMANS; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE;

EID: 79952035413     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: 10991050     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/hec.1582     Document Type: Article

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