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Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 211-223

Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment

Author keywords

Mixed systems; Multitasking; Provider payment

Indexed keywords

DESIGN; HEALTH INSURANCE; MEASUREMENT METHOD;

EID: 11144249316     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (119)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.