GPs and hospital expenditures. Should we keep expenditure containment programs alive?

Social Science and Medicine

Volumn 82, Issue , 2013, Pages 10-20

  Fiorentini, Gianluca ^a   Lippi Bruni, Matteo ^a   Ugolini, Cristina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Ambulatory care sensitive conditions; Economic incentives; Health economics; Hospital expenditure; Italy; Primary care

Indexed keywords

DATA SET; EXPENDITURE; HEALTH CARE; HEALTH POLICY; HEALTH SERVICES; HOSPITAL SECTOR;

ADULT; AMBULATORY CARE; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; COST CONTROL; FEMALE; GENERAL PRACTICE; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION; HOSPITAL RUNNING COST; HOSPITALIZATION; HUMAN; ITALY; MALE; MEDICAL FEE; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PRIMARY MEDICAL CARE;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; COST CONTROL; DATABASES, FACTUAL; FEMALE; GENERAL PRACTITIONERS; HOSPITAL COSTS; HOSPITALS; HUMANS; ITALY; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; PROGRAM EVALUATION; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; YOUNG ADULT;

ITALY;

EMILIA;

EID: 84875250115     PISSN: 02779536     EISSN: 18735347     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.025     Document Type: Article

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