Paying for performance and motivation crowding out

Economics Letters

Volumn 103, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 68-71

  Siciliani, Luigi ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Altruism; Motivation; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940363618     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.022     Document Type: Article

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