Strategic analysis of terrorism

Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 333-348

  Arce, Daniel G ^a   Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892271870     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_20     Document Type: Chapter

References (26)

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