Chapter 25 Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Handbook of Defense Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2007, Pages 775-813

  Sandler, Todd ^a   Arce, Daniel G ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b RHODES COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

assurance game; asymmetric information; counterterrorism; defensive measures; deterrence; externalities; hostage negotiations; interdependent risk; international cooperation; Prisoners' Dilemma; proactive measures; terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547485379     PISSN: 15740013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02025-4     Document Type: Review

References (51)

1. Arce D.G., and Sandler T. An evolutionary game approach to fundamentalism and conflict. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159 (2003) 132-154
2. Arce D.G., and Sandler T. Counterterrorism: A game-theoretic analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005) 183-200
3. Arce D.G., and Sandler T. The dilemma of the Prisoners' Dilemmas. Kyklos 58 (2005) 3-24
4. Arce, D.G., Sandler, T. (2007). "Signaling and the value of intelligence", British Journal of Political Science 37. In press
5. In: Arquilla J., and Ronfeldt D. (Eds). Networks and Netwars (2001), RAND, Santa Monica
6. Atkinson S.E., Sandler T., and Tschirhart J. Terrorism in a bargaining framework. Journal of Law and Economics 30 (1987) 1-21
7. Basuchoudhary A., and Razzolini L. Hiding in plain sight - Using signals to detect terrorists. Public Choice 128 (2006) 245-255
8. Bernheim B.D., and Whinston M. Common agency. Econometrica 54 (1986) 923-942
9. Bier, V., Oliveros, S., Samuelson, L. (2007). "Choosing what to protect: Strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker". Journal of Public Economic Theory. In press
10. Bueno de Mesquita E. Conciliation, commitment and counterterrorism: A formal model. International Organization 59 (2005) 145-176
11. Bueno de Mesquita E. The terrorist endgame: A model with moral hazard and learning. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005) 237-258
12. Bueno de Mesquita E. The quality of terror. American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005) 515-530
13. Cornes R., and Sandler T. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. second ed (1996), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
14. Enders W., and Sandler T. The effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies: A vector-autoregression-intervention analysis. American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 829-844
15. Enders W., and Sandler T. Terrorism: Theory and applications. In: Hartley K., and Sandler T. (Eds). Handbook of Defense Economics vol. 1 (1995), North-Holland, Amsterdam 213-249
16. Enders W., and Sandler T. Patterns of transnational terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative time-series estimates. International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002) 145-165
17. Enders W., and Sandler T. What do we know about the substitution effect in transnational terrorism?. In: Silke A. (Ed). Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (2004), Frank Cass, London 119-137
18. Enders W., and Sandler T. After 9/11: Is it all different now?. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005) 259-277
19. Enders W., and Sandler T. Transnational terrorism 1968-2000: Thresholds, persistence, and forecasts. Southern Economic Journal 71 (2005) 467-482
20. Enders W., and Sandler T. The Political Economy of Terrorism (2006), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
21. Enders W., and Sandler T. Distribution of transnational terrorism among countries by income classes and geography after 9/11. International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006) 367-393
22. Enders W., Sandler T., and Cauley J. UN conventions, technology, and retaliation in the fight against terrorism: An econometric evaluation. Terrorism and Political Violence 2 (1990) 83-105
23. Enders W., Sandler T., and Cauley J. Assessing the impact of terrorist-thwarting policies: An intervention time series approach. Defence Economics 2 (1990) 1-18
24. Heal G., and Kunreuther H. IDS models of airline security. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005) 201-217
25. Hoffman B. Inside Terrorism (1998), Columbia University Press, New York
26. Kunreuther H., and Heal G. Interdependent security. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26 (2003) 231-249
27. Landes W.M. An economic study of US aircraft hijackings, 1961-1976. Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978) 1-31
28. Lapan H.E., and Sandler T. To bargain or not to bargain: That is the question. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 78 (1988) 16-20
29. Lapan H.E., and Sandler T. Terrorism and signalling. European Journal of Political Economy 9 (1993) 383-397
30. Lee D.R. Free riding and paid riding in the fight against terrorism. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 78 (1988) 22-26
31. Lee D.R., and Sandler T. On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option. Public Choice 62 (1989) 141-152
32. Levitt M. Stemming the flow of terrorist financing: Practical and conceptual challenges. Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 27 (2003) 59-70
33. Li Q. Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents?. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005) 278-297
34. Mickolus E.F., Sandler T., and Murdock J.M. International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events, 2 vols (1989), Iowa State University Press, Ames
35. Overgaard P.B. The scale of terrorist attacks as a signal of resources. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (1994) 452-478
36. Rosendorff B.P., and Sandler T. Too much of a good thing? The proactive response dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004) 657-671
37. Sandler T. Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism. Public Choice 124 (2005) 75-93
38. Sandler T., and Arce D.G. Terrorism & game theory. Simulation & Gaming 34 (2003) 319-337
39. Sandler T., and Enders W. An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy 20 (2004) 301-316
40. Sandler T., and Lapan H.E. The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets. Synthèsis 76 (1988) 245-261
41. Sandler T., and Sargent K. Management of transnational commons: Coordination, publicness, and treaty formation. Land Economics 71 (1995) 145-162
42. Sandler T., and Siqueira K. Global terrorism: Deterrence versus preemption. Canadian Journal of Economics 39 (2006) 1370-1387
43. Sandler T., Tschirhart J., and Cauley J. A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism. American Political Science Review 77 (1983) 36-54
44. Selten R. A simple game model of kidnappings. In: Selten R. (Ed). Models of Strategic Rationality (1988), Kluwer Academic, Boston 77-93
45. Siqueira K. Political and militant wings within dissident movements and organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005) 218-236
46. Siqueira, K., Sandler, T. (2005), "Terrorists versus the government: Strategic interaction, support, and sponsorship". Unpublished manuscript. University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
47. Siqueira, K., Sandler, T. (2006). "Terrorist Backlash, terrorism prevention, and policy delegation". Unpublished manuscript. University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX
48. White J.R. Terrorism: 2002 update. fourth ed (2003), Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Belmont
49. White House. Progress report on the global war on terrorism. At (2003). http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/24087.htm Accessed 5 February 2004
50. Wilkinson P. Terrorism and Liberal State. revised ed (1986), Macmillan, London
51. Wilkinson P. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (2001), Frank Cass, London