Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?

Ecology Law Quarterly

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 673-712

  Lin, Albert C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84890510409     PISSN: 00461121     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (178)

1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 869 (2007).
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3. See T.J. Biasing, Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CENTER, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current-ghg.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2013).
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5. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-11-71, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE ENGINEERING TECHNICAL STATUS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS, AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES 29 (2011);
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7. 2 Fixation, 77 PROGRESS OCEANOGRAPHY 56, 79 (2008) (reporting modeling results predicting that even if entire Southern Ocean were fertilized with iron, such efforts could at best stimulate ocean uptake of only 11 percent of 2004 anthropogenic CO2 emissions).
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9. (concluding that factors other than iron also influence effectiveness of sequestration and that fertilization outside the Southern Ocean is relatively ineffective); Philip W. Boyd et al., Mesoscale Iron Enrichment Experiments 1993-2005: Synthesis and Future Directions, 315 Scr. 612, 612 (2007)
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11. See Mary W. Silver et al., Toxic Diatoms and Domoic Acid in Natural and Iron Enriched Waters of the Oceanic Pacific, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 20762, 20762 (2010).
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13. THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 17-18.
14. See Paul Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement By Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 211-12 (2006);
15. Alan Robock et al., Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric Geoengineering, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Oct. 2, 2009, L19703, at 3-7.
16. See THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 31.
17. See id.; Richard P. Turco & Fangqun Yu, Geoengineering the Stratospheric Sulfate Aerosol Layer to Offset Global Warming May Not Be Feasible (Dec. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Ecology Law Quarterly) (explaining that properties of injected aerosol would be far from ideal for blocking radiation).
18. 2 Injections, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Aug. 16, 2008, D16101, at 1;
19. Simone Tilmes et al., The Sensitivity of Polar Ozone Depletion to Proposed Geoengineering Schemes, 320 SCI. 1201, 1203-04 (2008)
20. (discussing how stratospheric aerosols would exacerbate depletion of protective ozone layer); THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 31
21. (noting a "range of so far unexplored feedback processes"); Oliver Morton, Climate Change: Is This What It Takes to Save the World?, 447 NATURE 132, 135 (2007) (remarking that the stratosphere "is tied to the troposphere below in complex ways that greenhouse warming is already changing").
22. See THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 36.
23. See Ken Caldeira & Michael E. Wickert, Ocean Model Predictions of Chemistry Changes from Carbon Dioxide Emissions to the Atmosphere and Ocean, S. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Sept. 21, 2005, C09S04, at 1;
24. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Darkening Sea, THE NEW YORKER, NOV. 20, 2006, at 66, 69-74.
25. See H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate - Carbon Simulations of Planetary Geoengineering, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 9949, 9951-52 (2007) (describing how temperatures, previously suppressed by aerosols, would quickly rebound to the levels they would have reached had no geoengineering been implemented).
26. See Edward A. Parson & David W. Keith, End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research, 339 SCI. 1278, 1278-79 (2013).
27. Edward A. Parson & Lia N. Ernst, International Governance of Climate Engineering, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 307, 325-27 (2013).
28. See Daniel Bodansky, The Who, What, and Wherefore of Geoengineering Governance, CLIMATIC CHANGE (Apr. 2013), http://link.springer.com/article/10. 1007%2Fs10584-013-0759-7# (exploring such scenarios); Parson & Ernst, supra note 20, at 330.
29. See, e.g., Asilomar Int'l Conference on Climate Intervention Techs., Statement from the Conference's Scientific Organizing Committee, THE CLIMATE RESPONSE FUND (Mar. 26, 2010), http://climateresponsefund.org/index.php?option= com-content%20&view=article&id=152&Itemid=89;
30. THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at ix
31. ("No geoengineering method can provide an easy or readily acceptable alternative solution to the problem of climate change."); Martin Bunzl, Researching Geoengineering: Should Not or Could Not?, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct. 30, 2009, 045104, at 2.
32. See THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at ix.
33. See, e.g., ASILOMAR SCIENTIFIC ORG. COMM., THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INTO CLIMATE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES 7 (2010) [hereinafter ASILOMAR RECOMMENDATIONS];
34. T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization, 314 SCI. 452, 452 (2006)
35. ("Mitigation is therefore necessary, but geoengineering could provide additional time to address the economic and technological challenges faced by a mitigation-only approach."); David W. Keith, Why Capture COzfrom the Atmosphere?, 325 SCI. 1654, 1654 (2009) (advocating CDR research while emphasizing that "[i]n the near term, efforts to limit climate risk should focus on reducing emissions").
36. See ASILOMAR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 24, at 7, 15; Asilomar Int'l Conference on Climate Intervention Techs., supra note 22; THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 57.
37. See, e.g. Max H. Bazerman, Climate Change as a Predictable Surprise, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 179, 184 (2006) ("[T]he likely illusory belief that a new technology will emerge to solve the problem [of climate change] creates a continuing excuse for the failure to act.").
38. For a more systematic cataloguing of possible moral hazard concerns, see Ben Hale, The World That Would Have Been: Moral Hazard Arguments Against Geoengineering, in ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: THE ETHICS OF SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT 113 (Christopher J. Preston ed., 2012).
39. 2 generated in fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes, so as to prevent its release into the atmosphere. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2005).
40. Moral hazard concerns associated with CCS include enabling further fossil fuel use and diverting resources away from renewable energy development. See Paul Baer, An Issue of Scenarios: Carbon Sequestration as Investment and the Distribution of Risk, 59 CLIMATIC CHANGE 283, 287 (2003).
41. Though sometimes characterized as a type of mitigation, CCS is not a perfect substitute for mitigation. See, e.g., id. at 289. Sequestered carbon may leak into the air, and the sequestration process itself generates additional carbon emissions. Klaus Keller et al., Carbon Dioxide Sequestration: How Much and When?, 88 CLIMATIC CHANGE 267, 268 (2008);
42. 2).
43. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, at 869.
44. See Ian Burton et al., From Impacts Assessment to Adaptation Priorities: The Shaping of Adaptation Policy, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 377, 379 (E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton eds., 2009);
45. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 19 (2007) (explaining that adaptation cannot cope with all projected effects of climate change, especially over the long term).
46. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 671 (4th ed. 2010);
47. Steve Rayner & Elizabeth L. Malone, Social Science Insights into Climate Change, in HUMAN CHOICE & CLIMATE CHANGE - Volume 4: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 71, 94-95 (Steve Rayner & Elizabeth L. Malone eds., 1998).
48. SIVAN KARTHA ET AL., ADAPTATION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE IN CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS, EUROPEAN CLIMATE PLATFORM REPORT #3 4 (2006);
49. see also GWYN PRINS ET AL., THE HARTWELL PAPER: A NEW DIRECTION FOR CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CRASH OF 2009 14 (2010) (describing adaptation as the "poor and derided cousin of emissions reduction").
50. See generally E. Lisa F. Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 31, at 359, 359-60 (discussing the UNFCCC's initial focus on mitigation). Although the Framework Convention obligates parties to develop measures to facilitate adaptation, the agreement's clear emphasis is on mitigation. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 2, 4.1(b), (e), 4.2, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164. The Kyoto Protocol, a supplemental agreement to the Framework Convention, concentrates on emissions reductions, particularly among industrialized countries. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 3, 4, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/ADD.1, 37 I.L.M. 32.
51. Ian Burton, Deconstructing Adaptation⋯ and Reconstructing, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 31, at 11;
52. see also J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 365-66 (2010).
53. Roger A. Pielke Jr., Rethinking the Role of Adaptation in Climate Policy, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 159, 162 (1998);
54. E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton, Understanding Adaptation: Origins, Concepts, Practice and Policy, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 31, at 1, 7.
55. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 162 (2009)
56. ("[Discussing adaptation was taboo among environmentalists, on the grounds that it would adversely affect efforts directed at combating climate change itself."); MARCO GRASSO, JUSTICE IN FUNDING ADAPTATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 13 (2010) (discussing the concern that "adaptation weakens the willingness to control GHG and thus ultimately crowds out mitigation initiatives"); Rayner & Malone, supra note 32, at 94 (noting fear that "discussion of the possibility of adaptation will attenuate the pressure to reduce emissions"); Burton, supra note 36, at 12.
57. Sally Kane & Jason F. Shogren, Linking Adaptation and Mitigation in Climate Change Policy, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 75, 94 (2000).
58. Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 574 (2004).
59. See Schipper, supra note 34, at 361-62; Richard S.J. Tol, Adaptation and Mitigation: Tradeoffs in Substance and Methods, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 572, 572 (2005) ("For a long time, it was politically incorrect to speak about adaptation to climate change because it presumably implies accepting defeat in the battle against evil emissions.").
60. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 240 (1992).
61. See Roger Pielke, Jr. et al., Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation, 445 NATURE 597, 597 (2007) (criticizing taboo on discussion of adaptation).
62. See Schipper, supra note 34, at 370-71; Shardul Agrawala & Samuel Fankhauser, Putting Climate Change Adaptation in an Economic Context, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: COSTS, BENEFITS AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS 19, 20 (Shardul Agrawala & Samuel Fankhauser eds., 2008) (describing adaptation "as an equally important and complementary response to greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation").
63. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 31, at 19;
64. GIDDENS, supra note 38, at 162. see also Robert R.M. Verchick, Adaptation, Economics, and Justice, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 277, 280-82 (David M. Driesen ed., 2010) (discussing current international, national, and local adaptation efforts).
65. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 31, at 19, 20; GRASSO, supra note 38, at 16.
66. The latest round of climate negotiations, held in Durban, South Africa in December 2011, failed to produce a successor agreement to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which had established modest GHG emissions caps for certain countries, applicable for a five-year period ending in 2012. The Durban summit produced only an agreement to adopt by 2015 a binding mitigation regime that would become effective in 2020. Eric J. Lyman, After Marathon Talks, Countries Set Goal for New Climate Deal in Effect Around 2020, 42 ENV'T REP. 2859 (2011).
67. Oliver Burkeman, Asking People to Reduce Their Carbon Emissions Is a Noble Invitation, but As Incentives Go, It Isn 't a Strong One, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 11, 2009, § G2, at 6.
68. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996);
69. see also CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 35 (1985) (characterizing moral hazard "in terms of the separation of policyholders' incentives to prevent loss from their control over loss prevention").
70. See Baker, supra note 64, at 238 (quoting investment advisor James Glassman on the point that "if you cushion the consequences of bad behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior"); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963).
71. See Sheila C. Dow, Moral Hazard and the Banking Crisis 7 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/v-2010-10-29- dow.pdf;
72. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979). Although mainstream economic theory is sometimes characterized as a positive, value-free form of analysis, it implies a consequentially approach to decision making. Dow, supra, at 5-7.
73. See Benjamin Hale, What's So Moral About Moral Hazard?, 23 PUB. AFF. Q. 1, 10 (2009) (describing how moral hazard is not a negative phenomenon).
74. See Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard, 90 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 383, 384 (1988) (explaining that moral hazard involves a trade-off between incentives and risk-bearing).
75. See Peter Zweifel & Willard G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 409, 410, 454 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000);
76. Eric French & Kirti Kamboj, Analyzing the Relationship Between Health Insurance, Health Costs, and Health Care Utilization, 26 ECON. PERSP. 60, 66 (2002).
77. See Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 258 (1987).
78. See Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Evidence from Medicare 24-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12764, 2006)
79. (finding that receipt of Medicare increased unhealthy behaviors among elderly males, after controlling for effect of increased physician visits on such behavior); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519, 527-28 (2007) (finding a small but statistically significant correlation between state-mandated health insurance coverage for treatment of diabetics and higher body mass index).
80. See Denis Bolduc et al., Workers' Compensation, Moral Hazard and the Composition of Workplace Injuries, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 623, 625 (2002) (summarizing studies).
81. See Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation, 58 J. RISK & INS. 191, 202 (1991).
82. See id. at 201-02; John W. Ruser, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, 9 J. LAB. & ECON. 325, 347-48 (1991).
83. See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 388 (2004) (also noting that increased fatalities due to increase in number of insureds is partly offset by more careful driving by those who choose to remain uninsured). No-fault limitations on liability, which limit the extent to which drivers can be sued, were also found to have a moral hazard effect of increasing fatalities. See id. at 359-60.
84. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 30-31 (2002).
85. See Raymond J. Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The US Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS 111, 112-13 (2001).
86. See id. at 116-17. see also Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 171, 173-76 (2006)
87. (discussing how federal "safe development" policies, including federal flood insurance and levee construction, facilitated development of low-lying, flood-prone areas in New Orleans area); Jian Wen, Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market 120 (Aug. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University), available at http:// digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=rmi-diss (finding establishment of national flood insurance to be positively correlated with population growth in flood-prone areas of Florida).
88. See Robert McLeman & Barry Smit, Vulnerability to Climate Change Hazards and Risks: Crop and Flood Insurance, 50 CAN. GEOGRAPHER 217, 223 (2006).
89. See Alan J. Kuperman, The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 49, 51 (2008).
90. See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1198 (1990);
91. Linda M. Hooks & Kenneth J. Robinson, Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Texas Banking in the 1920s, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 833, 834-35 (2002) (finding, based on analysis of data from Texas state-chartered banks during period from 1919 to 1926, that the existence of deposit insurance increased the likelihood of bank failure).
92. See Giovanni Dell'Ariccia et al., How Do Official Bailouts Affect the Risk of Investing in Emerging Markets?, 38 J. MONEY, CREDITA BANKING 1689, 1690-91 (2006).
93. See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the "New Financial Architecture," 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563, 564 (2009).
94. see also Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis, CATO J., Winter 2009, at 141, 142-45 (discussing the moral hazard effects of "subsidized" risk-taking).
95. See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew P. Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 196-97 (2009);
96. Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans, 125 Q.J. ECON. 307, 308 (2010) (finding that securitization led lenders to screen borrowers less carefully).
97. See James Hedlund, Risky Business: Safety Regulations, Risk Compensation, and Individual Behavior, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 82, 82 (2000).
98. See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677, 681-82 (1975);
99. GLENN C. BLOMQUIST, THE REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC SAFETY 91 (1988) (concluding that safety regulations increased safety for motorists, but less than had been predicted, and that such regulations reduced safety for nonoccupants).
100. See Adam Stetzer & David A. Hofmann, Risk Compensation: Implications for Safety Interventions, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 73, 74 (1996).
101. See Michael M. Cassell et al., Risk Compensation: The Achilles' Heel of Innovations in HIV Prevention?, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 605, 605 (2006);
102. Barbara A. Morrongiello et al., Risk Compensation in Children: Why Do Children Show It in Reaction to Wearing Safety Gear?, 28 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 56, 60 (2007); see generally Hedlund, supra note 102, at 86.
103. See Crutzen, supra note 11; see also A.M. Mercer et al., Public Understanding of Solar Radiation Management, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Oct. 24, 2011, 044006, at 2 (noting influence of Crutzen paper in breaking taboo).
104. HOUSE OF COMMONS SCI. AND TECH. COMM., THE REGULATION OF GEOENGINEERING 23 (2010);
105. see also THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 39, 43
106. (contending that "prospect of geoengineering could galvanise people to act, and demand action, on greenhouse gas emission reductions"). This report is not the first to make such an argument. See, e.g. Comment of Emily Lewis-Brown et al., to geoengineering@googlegroups.com (Sept. 9, 2010), available at http://groups.google.corn/group/geciengmeering/browse-thread/mread/ 8Md9afe573c447d/2f6a5193bfdlaf17
107. (discussion thread regarding whether geoengineering presents a moral hazard). Moreover, a recent policy paper aimed at developing a national strategic plan for U.S. geoengineering research makes no mention of moral hazard at all. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE REMEDIATION RESEARCH (2011).
108. IPSOS MORL EXPERIMENT EARTH?: REPORT ON A PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON GEOENGINEERING 82 (2010).
109. See Stephen M. Gardiner, Some Early Ethics of Geoengineering the Climate: A Commentary on the Values of the Royal Society Report, 20 ENVTL. VALUES 163, 166-67 (2011).
110. See Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May-June 2008, at 14, 17-18.
111. See MKE HULME, WHY WE DISAGREE ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING CONTROVERSY, INACTION AND OPPORTUNITY 208-09 (2009).
112. See Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1318-21 (2011);
113. John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1658-59 (1994).
114. See Paul C. Stern, Contributions of Psychology to Limiting Climate Change, 66 AM. PSYCHOL. 303, 309 (2011).
115. See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 414 (6th ed. 2012).
116. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 521 (2007)
117. (describing psychometric paradigm); Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 45, 47, 63 (2006); HULME, supra note 131, at 184.
118. See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction - Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 1, 1 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES] ("[J]udgment under uncertainty often rests on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather than extensive algorithmic processing⋯ ").
119. See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296, 296 (2010).
120. See Juliet Eilperin & Peyton M. Craighill, Global Warming No Longer Americans' Top Environmental Concern, Poll Finds, WASH. POST, July 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/global-warming-no-longer- americans-top-environmental-concern-poll-finds/2012/07/02/gJQAs9IHJW-story.html;
121. Anthony A. Leiserowitz, American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1433, 1440 (2005).
122. See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 137, at 103;
123. Elke U. Weber & Paul C. Stern, Public Understanding of Climate Change in the United States, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 315, 319 (2011).
124. See Weber & Stern, supra note 143, at 317-18; Bazerman, supra note 26, at 187-88. Weather-related disasters might trigger greater concern about GHG emissions if people believed that climate change caused such disasters. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 311-12 (2000).
125. Climate experts, however, have been reluctant until recently to draw such causal connections. See Deborah Zabarenko, Does Climate Change Increase the Odds of Extreme Weather Events?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 10, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2012/0710/Does-climate-change-increase-the- odds-of-extreme-weather-events.
126. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 137, at 334, 338-39;
127. Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown, Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 24 (1994)
128. ("[U]nrealistically optimistic beliefs about the future are held by normal individuals with respect to a wide variety of events."); see also Robert Gifford, The Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers that Limit Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 290, 292-93 (2011) (noting that "[u]ncertainty about climate change also quite likely functions as a justification for inaction").
129. See Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 109 (2006); Bazerman, supra note 26, at 185-86.
130. See M. GRANGER MORGAN & KATHARINE RICKE, INT'L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, COOLING THE EARTH THROUGH SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT: THE NEED FOR RESEARCH AND AN APPROACH TO ITS GOVERNANCE 12-13 (2010) (characterizing SRM as "cheap, fast and imperfect").
131. See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 137, at 230-32.
132. Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON. 45, 49 (2008).
133. Thomas C. Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of Geoengineering, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 303, 305 (1996).
134. See SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?: THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 6 (2007).
135. See Gifford, supra note 145, at 293; Dorothée Amelung & Joachim Funke, Dealing with the Uncertainties of Climate Engineering: Warnings from a Psychological Complex Problem Solving Perspective, 35 TECH. SOC'Y 32, 38-39 (2013).
136. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 144, at 312 (noting that "[p]eople prefer to see the world as a stable, well-ordered place where disasters have explanations"); Geeta Menon et al., Biases in Social Comparisons: Optimism or Pessimism?, 108 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 39, 42 (2009) (finding optimism bias more pronounced when perceived level of control is greater).
137. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 137, at 397.
138. See id. at 397-98; George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 268 (2001).
139. Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Global Warming, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 137, 140 (2006).
140. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2007);
141. DAN M. KAHAN ET AL., THE SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY: MAKING SENSE OF - AND MAKING PROGRESS IN - THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 2, 11-12 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1017189.
142. See KAHAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 2; Kahan, supra note 174, at 122; see also MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 54-62 (1970) (discussing classifications of cultural worldviews).
143. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083-84 (2005).
144. See KAHAN ET AL., supra note 174, at 3-4; see also Rachael Shwom et al., Understanding U.S. Public Support for Domestic Climate Change Policies, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 472, 479 (2010) (discussing how individuals' values and beliefs influence their policy opinions).
145. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change 15 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 89, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1871503.
146. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment 10 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 92, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract-id=1981907.
147. See JAMES HOGGAN WITH RICHARD D. LITTLEMORE, CLIMATE COVER-UP: THE CRUSADE TO DENY GLOBAL WARMING 42-43, 64-87 (2009);
148. Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance to Climate Change: A Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, supra note 51, at 84, 93.
149. See Weber & Stern, supra note 143, at 321; see also Peter J. Jacques et al., The Organisation of Denial: Conservative Think Tanks and Environmental Scepticism, 17 ENVTL. POL. 349 (2008) (analyzing efforts of conservative think tanks to dispute seriousness of environmental problems by promoting skepticism of science underlying environmental concerns).
150. See Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Anti-Reflectivity: The American Conservative Movement's Success in Undermining Climate Science and Policy, THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y, Mar.-May 2010, at 100, 109-10; Glicksman, supra note 188, at 98-99.
151. See McCright & Dunlap, supra note 190, at 107; Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Challenging Knowledge: How Climate Science Became a Victim of the Cold War, in AGNOTOLOGY: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF IGNORANCE 55, 76-78 (Robert N. Proctor & Londa Schiebinger eds., 2008); Jacques et al., supra note 189, at 354.
152. See McCright & Dunlap, supra note 190, at 110-11; Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy, 50 SOC. PROBS. 348, 353 (2003).
153. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 22 (1995).
154. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 10 (2001) (emphasis added).
155. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2007) (emphasis in original).
156. Richard A. Muller, Op-Ed., The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A19;
157. Richard A. Muller, Editorial, The Case Against Global-Warming Skepticism, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Oct. 21, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052970204422404576594872796327348.html.
158. See Weber & Stem, supra note 143, at 320-21; HOGGAN, supra note 188, at 31-48; NAOMI ORESKES & ERK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 169-70 (2010);
159. McCright & Dunlap, supra note 190, at 100-26; Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Climate Change Denial: Sources, Actors, and Strategies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 240, 240-59 (Constance Lever-Tracy ed., 2010).
160. Public Praises Science; Scientists Fault Public, Media: Scientific Achievements Less Prominent Than a Decade Ago, PEW RESEARCH (July 9, 2009), http://www.people-press.org/2009/07/09/section-5-evolution-climate-change-and- other-issues/.
161. See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Concerns About Global Warming Stable at Lower Levels, GALLUP (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146606/concems- global-warming-stable-lower-levels.aspx.
162. The United Kingdom's Institution of Mechanical Engineers, for instance, has urged that geoengineering be "fully integrated" into climate change policy. See INSTITUTION OF MECHANICAL ENG'RS, GEO-ENGINEERING: GIVING US THE TIME TO ACT? 3-4 (2009), available at http://thegreatdebate.org.uk/geo- engineering/GeoDocs/IMechEGeoengineeringReport.pdf.
163. See Tina Sikka, A Critical Discourse Analysis of Geoengineering Advocacy, 9 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 163, 170 (2012).
164. See Ian Sample, Scientists Offered Cash to Dispute Climate Study, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/feb/02/ frontpagenews.climatechange; HOGGAN, supra note 188, at 73-77; McCright & Dunlap, supra note 193, at 358.
165. Lee Lane, Researching Solar Radiation Management as a Climate Policy Option, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.aei.org/speech/100100.
166. Samuel Themstrom, Engineering Our Attitudes: How Geoengineering Can Inform Our Perspective on Climate Policy, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.aei.org/speech/energy-and-the-environment/climate-change/ engineering-our-attitudes/ (emphasis in original).
167. See THE ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 4, at 57;
168. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 13-14.
169. David W. Keith et al., Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now, 463 NATURE 426, 426 (2010)
170. (discussing SRM); see also Stephen M. Gardiner, The Desperation Argument for Geoengineering, 46 POL. SCI. & POL. 28, 28 (2013) (noting arguments in which "[d]esperation becomes a trump card").
171. Cf. Stephen M. Gardiner, Is "Arming the Future" with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?: Some Doubts About the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System, in CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL READINGS 284, 287 (Stephen M. Gardiner et al. eds., 2010) (warning, with respect to geoengineering, that "each generation of the affluent is vulnerable to moral corruption: if members of a generation give undue priority to what happens within their own lifetimes, they will welcome ways to justify overconsumption and give less scrutiny than they ought to arguments that license it").
172. See Edward A. Parson, Reflections on Air Capture: The Political Economy of Active Interventions in the Global Environment, 14 CLIMATIC CHANGE 5, 8 (2006).
173. See id. at 194-209; see also William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 606 (2003) (discussing devices used by insurers to protect themselves against moral hazard, including cost-sharing and tools of managed care).
174. See Gregor Betz, The Case for Climate Engineering Research: An Analysis of the "Arm the Future" Argument, 111 CLIMATIC CHANGE 473, 484 (2012).
175. See Douglass Famsworth, Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Are Consumer-Directed Plans the Answer?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 251, 263-65 (2006).
176. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1602-06 (2011).
177. In 2010, for example, the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity issued a decision urging that no geoengineering activities take place unless "science based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms" are in place. CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, REPORT OF THE TENTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, DECISION X/33: BIODIVERSITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE § 8(w) (2011), available at http://www.cbd.int/coplO/doc/.
178. For one such proposal, see Bidisha Banerjee, The Limitations of Geoengineering Governance in a World of Uncertainty, 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL'Y 15, 33-34 (2011).