Deposit insurance and moral hazard: Evidence from Texas banking in the 1920s

Journal of Economic History

Volumn 62, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 833-853

  Hooks, Linda M ^a   Robinson, Kenneth J ^b  

^a WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; FINANCIAL SERVICES; INSURANCE INDUSTRY; RISK FACTOR;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0036745841     PISSN: 00220507     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022050702001109     Document Type: Article

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