Control, consciousness, and agency

Goal-Directed Behavior

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 301-324

  Dijksterhuis, Ap ^a   Aarts, Henk ^b  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890175442     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203869666     Document Type: Chapter

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