Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions reconsidered: A test using new data

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1075-1094

  Bapat, Navin A ^a   Clifton Morgan, T ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPARATIVE STUDY; DATA SET; HYPOTHESIS TESTING; POLICY MAKING; PROTECTIONISM; SANCTION;

EID: 71649084969     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x     Document Type: Article

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