Sanctions, signals, and militarized conflict

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 415-431

  Lektzian, David J ^a   Sprecher, Christopher M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947671388     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00259.x     Document Type: Article

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