Grounded rationality: Descriptivism in epistemic context

Synthese

Volumn 189, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 39-49

  Elqayam, Shira ^a  

^a DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Descriptivism; Epistemic relativism; Grounded rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863824524     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0153-4     Document Type: Article

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