The Governance of Family Firms

Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 371-389

  Bennedsen, Morten ^a   Gonzalez, Francisco Perez ^b,d   Wolfenzon, Daniel ^c,d  

^a INSEAD   (France)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^d NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Inheritance regulation; Market economy; Performancedistribution; Productivity gap

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886113086     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781118258439.ch19     Document Type: Chapter

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