Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 134-151

  Ertugrul, Mine ^a   Krishnan, Karthik ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON   (United States)

^b NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Firm performance; turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649948646     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.09.008     Document Type: Article

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