Nonfamily managers, family firms, and the winner's curse: The influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 38, Issue 5, 2014, Pages 1103-1127

  Chrisman, James J ^a,b   Memili, Esra ^c   Misra, Kaustav ^d  

^a MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO   (United States)

^d SAGINAW VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883206728     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/etap.12014     Document Type: Article

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