Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the family firm

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 34, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1173-1182

  Verbeke, Alain ^a   Kano, Liena ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78349237646     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00419.x     Document Type: Article

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