Optimal incentive schemes for altruistic providers

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 15, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 675-699

  Makris, Miltiadis ^a   Siciliani, Luigi ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84882645076     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12047     Document Type: Article

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