Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 428-440

  Makris, Miltiadis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Administrative constraint; Asymmetric information; Mission orientated organisations

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349246828     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.013     Document Type: Article

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