Philosophy of Game Theory

Philosophy of Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 531-576

  Grüne Yanoff, Till ^a   Lehtinen, Aki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84882539614     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-51676-3.50019-1     Document Type: Chapter

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