Decisions in games: Why there should be a special exemption from Bayesian rationality

Journal of Economic Methodology

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 43-60

  Mariotti, Marco ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038026287     PISSN: 1350178X     EISSN: 14699427     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13501789700000003     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Anscombe, F. J., and Aumann, R. J., 1963. A definition of subjective probability. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34: 199–205.
2. Asheim, G., 1991. Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games. Games and Economic Behaviour, 3: 278–294.
3. Aumann, R. J., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics, 4: 1236–1239.
4. Aumann, R. J., 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica, 55: 1–18.
5. Aumann, R.J. (1989) ‘Irrationality in game theory’, Working Paper, Hebrew University.
6. Bernheim, D., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behaviour. Econometrica, 52: 1007–1028.
7. Binmore, K., 1992. “ Foundations of game theory ”. In Advances in Economic Theory. Sixth World Congress, Vol. 1, Econometric Society Mono-graphs, Edited by: Laffont, J. J., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Binmore, K., 1993. “ De-Bayesing game theory ”. In Frontiers of Game Theory, Edited by: Binmore, K., Kirman, A. P., and Tani, P., Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
9. Borgers, T., 1992. Iterated elimination of dominated strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth model. Review of Economic Studies, 59: 163–176.
10. Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E., 1987. Rationalizability and correlated equilibria. Econometrica, 55: 1391–1402.
11. Greenberg, J., 1990. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-TheoreticApproach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. Greenberg, J., 1995. Stable (incomplete) contracts in dynamic games. Mimeo. McGillUniversity.
13. Hammond, P. J., 1988. Consequentialist foundations for expected utility. Theory and Decision, 25: 25–78.
14. Hammond, P. J., 1993. “ Aspects of rationalizable behaviour ”. In Frontiers of Game Theory, Edited by: Binmore, K., Kirman, A. P., and Tani, P., Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
15. Hammond, P.J. (1996a) Private communication. 12 March 1996.
16. Hammond, P. J., 1996b. “ Subjective expected utility and non-cooperative games ”. In Handbook of Utility Theory, Edited by: Barberh, S., Hammond, P. J., and Seidl, C., Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers (in preparation), Ch. 14.
17. Harsanyi, J. C., 1975. Nonlinear social welfare functions: do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality?. Theory and Decision, 6: 311–332.
18. Harsanyi, J. C., 1977. Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. Harsanyi, J. C., 1978. Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 68: 223–228.
20. Harsanyi, J. C., 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games: comments on Kadane and Larkey's paper, and Rejoinder to Professors Kadane and Larkey. Management Science, 28: 120–124. 124–5
21. Harsanyi, J. C., and Selten, R., 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection inGames, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
22. Kadane, J., and Larkey, P. D., 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Science, 28: 113–120.
23. Kalai, E., and Satterthwaite, M. A., 1994. “ The kinked demand curve, facilitatingpractices and oligopolistic coordination ”. In Imperfections and Behaviour in Economic Organizations, Edited by: Gilles, R. P., and Ruys, P. H. M., Amsterdam: KluwerAcademic Publishers, Amsterdam, Ch. 2.
24. Kreps, D., 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Heme1 Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
25. Lewis, D., 1969. Conventions: a Philosophical Study, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
26. Luce, D., and Raiffa, R., 1957. Games and Decisions, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
27. Mariotti, M., 1992. “ Three essays on credibility and beliefs in game theory ”. University of Cambridge. Ph.D. dissertation
28. Mariotti, M., 1995. Is Bayesian rationality compatible with strategic rationality?. Economic Journal, 105: 1099–1109.
29. Mariotti, M., 1996a. “ The decision theoretic foundations of game theory ”. In Rationality in Economics, Edited by: Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Pearlman, M., and Schmidt, C., London: MacMillan.
30. Mariotti, M., 1996b. “ Balanced equilibrium: a model of behaviour in games based on continuity and the principle of insufficient reason ”. In Economic and Environmental Risk and Uncertainty: New Models and Methods, Edited by: Nau, R., Gronn, E., Machina, M., and Bergland, 0., Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers. in press
31. Moriotti, M., 1996c. “ Qualitatively consistent strategic behaviour ”. Mimeo: University ofManchester.
32. Moulin, H., 1979. Dominance solvable voting schemes. Econometrica, 56: 1191–1220.
33. Myerson, R. B., 1990. Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
34. Pearce, D., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behaviour and the problem of perfection. Econometrica, 52: 1029–1050.
35. Savage, L. J., 1954. The Foundations of Statistics, New York: John Wiley and Sons.
36. Tan, J. C. C., and Werlang, S. R. C., 1988. The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts in games. Journal of Economics Theory, 45: 370–391.
37. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., 1947. Theory of Games and EconomicBehaviour, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.