The evolutionary turn in game theory

Journal of Economic Methodology

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 113-130

  Sugden, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242309271     PISSN: 1350178X     EISSN: 14699427     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13501780010023289     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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