On the foundations of nash equilibrium

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 67-88

  Jørgen Jacobsen, Hans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042739305     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100003722     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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