Prospect theory and the brain

Neuroeconomics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 145-173

  Fox, Craig R ^a   Poldrack, Russell A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84882520788     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-374176-9.00011-7     Document Type: Chapter

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