Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 767-784

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a   Talgam Cohen, Inbal ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Interdependence; Optimal auctions; Prior independence

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EXPECTED REVENUE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL MECHANISMS; INTERDEPENDENCE; OPTIMAL AUCTION; OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGNS; PRIOR-INDEPENDENCE; SECOND-PRICE AUCTION;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84879753540     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2492002.2482606     Document Type: Conference Paper

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