Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good

Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 77-101

  Branco, Fernando ^a,b  

^a CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PORTUGAL   (Portugal)

^b BANCO DE PORTUGAL   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030306231     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf01212013     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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