The effectiveness of English auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 214-238

  Neeman, Zvika ^a,b  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Effectiveness; English auction; Private values model; Second price auction; Worst case

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038392425     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00005-8     Document Type: Article

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