How did RGGI do it? Political economy and emissions auctions

Ecology Law Quarterly

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 59-106

  Huber, Bruce R ^a,b  

^a NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84878435479     PISSN: 00461121     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (255)

1. At the time of this writing, the most popularized form of emissions trading regulation, capand-trade, is in ill repute in the prevailing economic and political climate in Congress. This is despite the fact that California recently launched a substantial greenhouse gas reduction effort using a cap-and-trade approach. Even as many national politicians distance themselves from cap-and-trade and some speak of a "post cap-and-trade" environment, it is far too early to prepare the wake. See Ann Carlson, Cap-and-Trade is Alive and Well, LEGAL PLANET (Nov. 16, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/11/16/cap-and-trade-is-alive-and-well/ (arguing that cap-and-trade systems remain "as popular a policy option as ever" despite inaction by the U. S. federal government);
2. BNA, Webinar: "Climate Change Communications: The Post Cap-and-Trade Debate" (Dec. 8, 2011) (on file with author).
3. Emissions trading programs are widely credited, for instance, with reducing the harms associated with leaded gasoline, ozone-depleting gases, and acid rain. For a book-length assessment, see T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006).
4. See, e.g., Robert Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies: What Can We Learn from U. S. Experience (and Related Research) ?, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 19, 19 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (noting that command-and-control regulation allows "relatively little flexibility" and tends to "force firms to take on similar shares of the pollution control burden, regardless of the cost").
5. Cap-and-trade, for example, was brought to the national stage not by a Democrat but by President George H. W. Bush, whose administration spearheaded the development of the Acid Rain Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Until quite recently, many Republicans continued to champion cap-and-trade as a market-based improvement to earlier forms of environmental regulation. See, e.g., Richard Conniff, Blue Sky Thinking, SMITHSONIAN, Aug. 2009, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Presence-of-Mind-Blue-Sky-Thinking. html;
6. Jon Hilsenrath, Cap-and-Trade's Unlikely Critics: Its Creators, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A7.
7. See, e.g., Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, U. S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective, 101 PUB. CHOICE 109 (1999) (explaining business and utility support for emissions trading).
8. See, e.g., Leigh Raymond, The Emerging Revolution in Emissions Trading Policy, in GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN AMERICA 101, 105 (Barry G. Rabe ed., 2010) (describing "the idea that the government might sell allowances to the highest bidder" as "unthinkable" in conventional models of cap-and-trade).
9. Many environmental economists and other analysts believe carbon taxation to be the policy tool that could most effectively combat climate change, but it is generally treated as a political impossibility. See, e.g., SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011);
10. Barry G. Rabe, The "Impossible Dream " of Carbon Taxes: Is the "Best Answer" a Political Non-Starter?, in GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 126 [hereinafter Rabe, The "Impossible Dream" of Carbon Taxes];
11. Barry G. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition: Selecting Climate Policy Tools in the United States, 23 GOVERNANCE 583 (2010) [hereinafter Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition].
12. Rabe acknowledges the conventional political wisdom, but notes that other policies-including auctions of emissions allowances-can in effect impose a "stealth" carbon tax. Rabe, Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra, at 596-99.
13. RGGI's member states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. See RGGI, http://rggi.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
14. New Jersey, one of the original members, withdrew from RGGI on the order of Governor Chris Christie in early 2011, effective at the end of that year. Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 10-State Climate Initiative, N. Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011, at A20.
15. RGGI's emissions cap covers only "fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units having a rated capacity equal to or greater than 25 megawatts." RGGI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 2(2005), available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou-final-12-20-05.pdf [hereinafter RGGI MOU].
16. As of November 2012, cumulative auction proceeds under RGGI totaled over $1 billion; for current totals, see Cumulative Allowances & Proceeds (by State), RGGI, www.rggi.org/market/co2-auctions/resultstate-proceeds (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
17. See Gerald B. Silverman, RGGI States Retiring Unsold Allowances, Signaling Possible Tightening of Carbon Cap, STATE ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 30, 2012, Bloomberg BNA;
18. Nathanial Gronewold, Consultants Say RGGI Beats Emission Targets by Doing Nothing, Suggest Tighter Cap, CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.eenews. net/climatewire/2010/11/15/archive/4.
19. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Power Companies Bring Fragile Coalition to Cap-and-Trade Debate, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2009/03/19/1.
20. For an extended reflection on the role of equity norms in shaping political and social opinion about allocative mechanisms, see LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES: EQUITY AND PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2003).
21. John Wihbey, Learning from the Difficult Lessons of Real-World Regional Cap-and-Trade, YALE FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE & THE MEDIA, May 5, 2009, available at http://www.yaleclimatemediaforum.org/2009/05/learning-rrom-the- difiicult-lessonsof-real-world-regional-cap-andtrade/.
22. See also Joseph Kruger & William A. Pizer, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Prelude to a National Program?, RESOURCES, Winter 2005, at 4.
23. See History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative. org/history (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
24. See, e.g., Nathanial Gronewold, Traders and Experts Say Regional Cap-and-Trade Systems Will Proliferate, CLIMATEWIRE (June 16, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/06/16/5 (noting that "the RGGI system appears to be the model most states and provinces are referencing in designing further regional cap-and-trade systems");
25. Paul Hibbard, Cap and Trade Has Lessons for California, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 6, 2012, http://www.sacbee.com/2012/04/29/4449306/cap-andtrade-has-lessons- for.html (relating economic data gained from RGGI to California's implementation of a carbon market);
26. Hannah Fairfield, When Carbon is Currency, N. Y. TIMES (May 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/business/yourmoney/06emit2.html?-r=0 (RGGI officials are "helping California figure out how best to accomplish its climate plan").
27. The New Hampshire legislature voted to bow out of the Initiative in the spring of 2011, but Governor John Lynch's veto barely withstood the legislature's override attempt. Lynch Vetoes RGGI Repeal, CONCORD MONITOR, July 7, 2011, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/266848/lynch-vetoes-rggi-repeal.
28. Maine's Tea Party-backed governor has suggested rollbacks in environmental regulation, but rather than withdraw from RGGI, Maine enacted legislation by which the state would automatically exit the program upon the withdrawal of a majority of the other member states. Coral Davenport, Climate Change Fight Moves to States, NAT'L J., Feb. 24, 2011, http://www. nationaljournal.com/maga7ine/climate-change-fight-moves-to-states-20110224.
29. Finally, proposed legislation in Delaware to terminate its participation in RGGI died in committee. Kara Nuzback, House Committee Votes to Stay Green: Bill to End RGGI in Delaware Tabled, CAPE GAZETTE, May 20, 2011, at 20.
30. 2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 8 (2011).
31. Auction results can be found it Auction Results, RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2-auctions/results (last accessed Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Auction Results].
32. See Auction Results, supra note 24.
33. See Joey Peters, The RGGI Raid: How Cap-and-Trade Revenues Went to Fix State Budgets, STATELINE (June 26, 2010), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/ story?contentld=494460 (noting that New York, New Jersey and New Hampshire have repurposed RGGI funds to meet state budget shortfalls);
34. Christa Marshall, Money to Fight Climate Change Gets Siphoned into Other Budgets, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 19, 2010), http://eenews.net/climatewire/2010/03/19/ 6.
35. See Gerald B. Silverman, Emissions Declined Significantly in 2011 for Stales in RGGI Program, Report Says, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Jan. 17, 2012, at A-1.
36. See Martin Feldstein, Cap-and-Trade: All Cost, No Benefit, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at A15;
37. John M. Broder, "Cap and Trade" Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A13.
38. But see Carlson, Cap-and-Trade is Alive and Well, supra note 1.
39. 2 TAXATION IN EUROPE (1998).
40. The idea of trading units of emissions among firms is commonly traced to J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND ECONOMICS (1968).
41. Other seminal works along this line include William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Pricing for Protection of the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42 (1971);
42. W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Progress, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972);
43. T. H. Tietenberg, The Design of Property Rightsfor Air Pollution Control, 27 PUB. POL'Y 275 (1974);
44. Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
45. David Wiegel, Pretty Much Every Republican Front-Runner Used to Support Cap and Trade, SLATE (May 11, 2011), http://www.slate.eom/blogs/weigel/2011/05/l l/pretty-much-every-republican-front-runner-used-to-support-cap-and-trade.html.
46. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U. S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM (2000);
47. x 20 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 253 (2005);
48. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cost Savings from Allowance Trading in the 1990 Clean Air Act: Estimates from a Choice-Based Model, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FRDMTWENTY YEARSOF EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 194.
49. But see Shelby Gerking & Stephen F. Hamilton, What Explains the Increased Utilization of Powder River Basin Coal in Electric Power Generation?, 90 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 933 (2008).
50. Before modern environmental regulation, the law of nuisance, for example, was applied to limit emissions in some instances. ROGER W. FTNDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 273 (6th ed. 2003).
51. See MARK S. SQUILLACE & DAVID R. WOOLEY, AIR POLLUTION 55-70 (3d ed. 1999).
52. Clean Air Act §§ 108-109
53. 42 U. S. C. §§ 7408-7410 (2006).
54. The EPA's approach, known as the Emissions Trading Program, included four elements-emission offsets, netting, bubbles and banking-explained at Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43, 814 (Dec. 4, 1986).
55. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989).
56. Clean Air Act § 173 (a) (1)
57. 42 U. S. C. § 7503 (a) (1) (new permits in nonattainment areas conditioned on applicant's ability to obtain "sufficient offsetting emissions reductions").
58. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 43, 832 (defining as creditable only those emissions reductions "not required by current regulations").
59. Authorizing legislation is found in Title VI of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7671.
60. Pub. L. No. 101-549. The Acid Rain Program was codified as Title IV-A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. §7651.
61. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57, 356 (Oct. 27, 1998)
62. (codified at 40 C. F. R. pts. 51, 72, 75, and 96).
63. A very small fraction of allowances-just 2.8 percent-in the Acid Rain Program was withheld and auctioned as well; payments for these allowances were rebated to buyers on a pro rata basis. Clean Air Act § 416
64. 42 U. S. C. § 765 lo;
65. x Allowance Auction, 69 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 190 (2009).
66. see J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011).
67. See, e.g., W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972);
68. Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 133 (1995);
69. T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 127 (2d ed. 2005).
70. For a more recent examination of the conditions under which allowance allocation may affect program performance, see Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance, 54 J. L. & ECON. S267 (2011).
71. See Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91 (2011);
72. see also Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 419 (1990) (noting that existing players can obtain transition policies because the "victims" of a regulatory "oldnew division" are "usually hard to identify, do not perceive themselves as victims, and are not politically organized").
73. See, e.g., Paul Clancy, Fairness Question Stalls Clean Air Bill, USA TODAY, Feb. 9 1990, at 6A (noting the initial opposition of, among others, Ohio Senator John Glenn);
74. Karl Hausker, The Politics and Economics of Auction Design in the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Pollution, 11 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 553, 566-57 (1992) (describing the political vectors shaping allowance allocation); Raymond, supra note 17, at 68-108 (providing an in-depth case study of the congressional debates over allocation in the Acid Rain Program); Hahn & Stavins, supra note 47, at 4.
75. See Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 599-605.
76. For other general discussions of the problems related to grandfathering in the context of tradable permit programs, see Kim Neats Martinez & Karsten Neuhoff, Allocation of Carbon Emission Certificates in the Power Sector: How Generators Profit from Grandfathered Rights, 5 CLIMATE POL. 61 (2005);
77. Edan Rotenberg, Ending Both Forms of Grandfathering in Environmental Law, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 717 (2007).
78. See, e.g., MARK TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 548-51 (3d ed. 1992).
79. See Robert Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 29 (2006).
80. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., PRICING CARBON: THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 114 (2010).
81. Title IV-A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7651 (2006).
82. Independent power producers became an increasingly important category in the wake of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117(1978), which incentivized utilities to purchase electricity from these entities, often at above-market prices.
83. See John T. Miller Jr., Conscripting State Regulatory Authorities in a Federal Electric Rate Regulatory Regime: A Goal of PURPA Partially Realized, 4 ENERGY L. J. 77 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Independents Seek More Assurance They Can Get Emission "Allowances", INDEP. POWER REP., Jan. 12, 1990, at 13;
85. Lori M. Rodgers, Wanted: Federal and State Cooperation, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 20, 1990, at 34;
86. Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U. S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J. L. & ECON. 37, 42 (1998).
87. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Part 3): Hearing of the Energy and Power Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101th Cong. (1989) (including testimony to this effect from several regulators and industry participants). Price uncertainty did appear to dampen trading during the Program's early years;
88. see U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-30, ALLOWANCE TRADING OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE EMISSIONS AT LESS COST 29 (1994) ("Utilities are uncertain about the price at which to buy or sell allowances because of limited and conflicting price information. ").
89. STEFAN WEISHAAR, TOWARDS AUCTIONING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM 5-7 (2009) (citing Article 10a (11) of Directive 2009/29, which also provides free allocations in various circumstances and other forms of transition relief).
90. Justin Cunningham, Carbon Jackpot, PROF. ENGINEERING, Mar. 7, 2007, at 27.
91. 2 Emission Trading on Firm Profits and Market Prices, 6 CLIMATE POL'Y 31 (2006);
92. 2 Cost Pass-Through and Windfall Profits in the Power Sector, 6 CLIMATE POL'Y 49 (2006).
93. But see A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 24-31 (2008) (identifying several difficulties with the windfall profits idea).
94. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CONGRESSIONAL POLICY BRIEF; GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION (2008).
95. see Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?): Developing the Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 88 OR. L. REV. 405, 436-38 (2009).
96. 2 Abatement Policies: What Does it Cost?, in BEHAVIORAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf eds., 2001);
97. Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, in MOVTNG TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 63, 81;
98. Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Compensation Rules for Climate Policy in the Electricity Sector, 27 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 819 (2008).
99. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 095 (2006) (decrying grandfathering as an inefficient drag on capital turnover);
100. Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379, 415 (2000);
101. Garth Heutel, Plant Vintages, Grandfathering, and Environmental Policy, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 36 (2011).
102. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37 (2008);
103. Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N. Y. U. L. REV. 101 (2010);
104. Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition Relief, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1581 (2011).
105. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U. S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339 (1993).
106. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, Gaming the Past, supra note 46;
107. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 90 (2d ed., 2008) ("So far, experience with attempts to 'cap' carbon and trade 'allowances' have been fraught with corruption as each player has insisted on having a supersized initial endowment. It would be one thing if carbon 'allowances' were sold to the highest bidders and the money invested in clean technologies. It is another thing that the 'allowances' are constructed from political whole cloth and allocated accordingly.").
108. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 809 (2009).
109. With respect to the ETS, see Susan J. Kurkowski, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union: Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment, 14 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 698 (2006).
110. and Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U. S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J. Law & ECON. 37 (1998).
111. See WORLD RES. INST., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON THE DESIGN ELEMENTS OF A MANDATORY MARKET-BASED GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY SYSTEM 12(2006), available at http://pdf.wri.org/ghg-regulation-testimony-060313.pdf.
112. see Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009).
113. See A. Denny Ellerman, Barbara K. Buchner & Carlo Carraro, The EU ETS Allocation Process: An Overview, in ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: RIGHTS, RENTS, AND FAIRNESS 3, 8 (A. Denny Ellerman, Barbara K. Buchner, & Carlo Carraro eds., 2007).
114. See Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather, 30 ENERGY POL'Y 333, 343 (2002) (noting that under grandfathering, "firms may end up putting as much effort into rent capture as into finding efficient ways to reduce carbon usage").
115. See, e.g., Giuseppe Lopomo et al., Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the United States, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 25 (2011).
116. see also Tom Tietenberg, Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an Economic Idea, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 359, 362 (2010) (auctions in the Acid Rain Program developed in response to concerns that "lack of price transparency inhibited effective emissions trading"').
117. Clean Air Act § 416 (dX3)
118. 42 U. S. C. § 7651o (d) (3) (2006).
119. But see Edwin Woerdman et al., Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle: Do Polluters Pay Under Grandfathering?, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 565 (2008) (arguing that grandfathering is compatible with certain formulations of the polluter pays principle).
120. See Lawrence H. Ooulder et al., Revenue-Raising Versus Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J. ECON. 708 (1997).
121. See Robert W. Hahn, Greenhouse Gas Auctions and Taxes: Some Political Economy Considerations, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 167 (2009).
122. See Edwin Woerdman & Steven Weishaar, Pros and Cons of Auctioning Emission Rights: A Law and Economics Perspective (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2010-1, 2010), available at http://ssrn. com/abstracts 596682.
123. Power producers as a category are responsible for roughly 72 percent of all domestic greenhouse gas emissions. Andrew Childers & Avery Fellow, Power Plants Accounted for 72 Percent of Greenhouse Gases Reported in 2010, 43 BNA ENV'T REP. 80 (2012).
124. See The REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES: AUCTIONING EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES 5 (2008).
125. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 221 (2010);
126. Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage in the USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008).
127. 2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 353, 366 (2009);
128. Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 835, 862-81 (2008).
129. See generally B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of "Cap and Trade" Policies, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 445 (2007) (explaining how politics influences the structure and operation of cap and trade programs).
130. See Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 379 (2009).
131. See Don Fullerton, Six Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16703, 2011).
132. For a general discussion of "structural power", see Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State, 30 POL. & SOC'Y 277, 279-83 (2002).
133. See also Charles Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. POL. 324 (1982).
134. See, e.g., Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles's Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 251-58 (1999).
135. Environmental justice advocates in California recently brought a high-profile suit attempting to stop that state from instituting a cap-and-trade policy. The challenge failed. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65 (Ct. App. 2012).
136. See, e.g., Anne C. Mulkem, Industry Witnesses' Dominance of Hill Hearings Irks Consumer Advocates, GREENWIRE (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/ public/Greenwire/2009/! 1/12/1.
137. See, e.g., DAVID SASSCON, GREENPEACE, BUSINESS AS USUAL: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PENDING FEDERAL CLIMATE LEGISLATION (2009).
138. See, e.g., Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 602.
139. This generalization masks an interesting and oft-studied principal-agent problem that arises between legislatures and bureaucrats. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999);
140. Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203 (2005).
141. See Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 599-603.
142. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367-70 (1980).
143. See Elizabeth Benjamin, New York Task Force Calls for Sharp Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions, TIMES UNION, Apr. 24, 2003, LexisNexis.
144. See Michael Gormley, Pataki Asks Regional Solution to Power Emissions; Critics Say New York Governor Is Avoiding His Duty to Cut Pollution at State Electric Generating Plants, TIMES UNION, Apr. 26, 2003, LexisNexis.
145. See Erin Duggan, Mixed Reviews for Regional Emissions Plan; States Voice Interest in Pataki Proposal, but Critics Say It's Inadequate, TIMES UNION, July 25, 2003, LexisNexis.
146. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, AND SHORT-TERM ACTION ITEMS (2004), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ actionplanfinal.pdf.
147. These sorts of questions were discussed, for example, at the RGGI Stakeholder meeting of June 24, 2004. See RGGI, INC., RGGI STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING #3: MEETING SUMMARY 5-9 (June 24, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/final-summary-6-24-04.pdf [hereinafter STAKEHOLDER MEETING #3 SUMMARY].
148. Documents related to this workshop are available at http://rggi.org/ design/history/topical-workshops under "Allocations Workshop Presentations"
149. See, e.g., Dale S. Bryk, Natural Res. Def. Council, Presentation to the RGGI Workshop on Allocations: Public Benefit Allowance Allocations (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/bryk-pres-10-14-04.pdf;
150. Richard Cowart, The Regulatory Assistance Project, Presentation to the RGGI Workshop on Allocations: Allocating to Power Resources: Economic and Environmental Options (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/cowart- pres-10-14-04.pdf;
151. Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Res. for the Future, Presentation to the RGGI Workshop on Allocations: The Initial Distribution of Tradable CO2 Emission Allowances in RGGI: Compensation and Economic Efficiency (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/burtraw-pres-10-14-04.pdf.
152. 2 Allowances in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Preliminary Observations (June 24, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/burtraw-presentation-6-24-04. ppt.
153. 2 Allowances (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/doc s/braine-pres-l 0-14-04.pdf.
154. Analysts reported that in a national analysis, a 21 percent grandfathered allocation would be sufficient to compensate generators. See STAKEHOLDER MEETING #3 SUMMARY, supra note 118, at 4.
155. See Ken Costello, Increased Dependence on Natural Gas for Electric Generation: Meeting the Challenge, 17 ELECTRICITY J. 10 (2004).
156. See Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate Legislation Can Mobilize Efficiency and Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, 33 VT. L. REV. 201 (2008).
157. See HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U. S. ECONOMY (2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/ Client-Service/Electric-Power-and-Natural-Gas/Latest-thinking/ Unlocking-energy-efficiency-in-the-US-economy.
158. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, HOW MODELING INFORMED THE DESIGN OF THE US REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2010), available at http://www.raponline.org/Publications.asp.
159. As of an August 2005 memo from the Working Group to the Agency Heads, the Group's proposal was that 5 percent be allocated to a regional Strategic Carbon Fund, and that "all states agree to propose-for legislative and/or regulatory approval-that 20 percent of the allowances will be allocated for a public benefit purpose." Memorandum from the RGGI Staff Working Group to the RGGI Agency Heads 2 (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://rggi.org/docs/rggi- proposaL8-24-05.pdf (emphasis added). In time, the 20 percent proposal became a requirement.
160. Press Release, Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach Agreement on Proposed Rules for the Nation's First Cap-and-Trade Program to Address Climate Change (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model-rule- release-8-15-06.pdf.
161. ENV'T NE., RGGI ALLOWANCE ALLOCATIONS & USE OF AUCTION PROCEEDS 2(2009), available at, http://www.env-ne.org/public/resources/pdf/ENE-Auction- Tracker-3.20.09.pdf.
162. 2 Rights Meets IPPNY Resistance, but State Defends It, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Dec. 11, 2006, LexisNexis.
163. See Jay Fitzgerald, Romney OK with Plan on Emissions, BOS. HERALD, July 24, 2003, at 38;
164. Amanda Little, Mass. Lawmakers Pushing to Join Climate Pact, Despite Romney's Objections, GRIST (Jan. 27, 2006, 4:36 AM), http://grist.org/politics/ romneyl.
165. Press Release, Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts, Governor Patrick Signs Regional Pact to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2007/pact- signed-to-reduce-greenhouse-gases.html.
166. 2 Auction Off to a Strong Start (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi- press-9-29-2008.pdf.
167. 2 Allowance Allocation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Effect on Electricity Investors, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 79 (2006);
168. Paul J. Hibbard & Susan Tierney, Carbon Control and the Economy: Economic Impacts of RGGI's First Three Years, 24 ELECTRICITY J. 30 (2011);
169. Yihsu Chen, Does a Regional Greenhouse Gas Policy Make Sense? A Case Study of Carbon Leakage and Emissions Spillover, 31 ENERGY ECON. 667 (2009);
170. Anthony Paul et al., The Role of Energy Efficiency Spending in Maryland's Implementation of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 6820 (2010);
171. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 597.
172. (quoting Kwang-Hoon Less & Jos C. N. Raadschelders, Political-Administrative Relations: Impact of and Puzzles in Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981, 21 GOVERNANCE 419, 429 (2008)).
173. see BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004).
174. See Northeast States Aim to Cut Carbon Emissions: Nine Northeast States to Cut Plant Emissions, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2005;
175. Brian J. Cook, Arenas of Power in Climate Change Policymaking, 38 POL'Y STUD. J. 465, 478 (2010).
176. See Clean Air Act § 184, 42 U. S. C. § 7511 c (2006).
177. x SIP Call, 2003-2008, EPA (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ progsregs/nox/sip. html.
178. See Barry O. Rabe, Mikael Roman & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 42 (2005).
179. 549 U. S. 497 (2007).
180. See also Jennifer Lee, The Warming Is Global but the Legislating, in the U. S., Is All Local, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A20.
181. See, e.g., Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1151-52 (2009) (finding it "obvious that RGGI is the direct offspring" of prior joint efforts among the northeastern states, some of which were mandated by federal regulation).
182. See Barry G. Rabe, Regionalism and Global Climate Change Policy: Revisiting Multistate Collaboration as an Intergovernmental Management Tool, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 176, 185 (Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. Posner eds., 2008) ("[T]he construction of the RGGI has been eased greatly by the substantial experience among participating states with previous forms of emissions trading-This experience was embedded in long-standing collaboration on environmental and related matters.").
183. X BUDGET PROGRAM 9(2005), available at http://pdf.wri.org/nox-ghg.pdf.
184. See, e.g., Mathew Carr, Emissions Profits in Europe Plunge as Data Questioned, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= newsarchive&sid=agFHU6rBtNoE&refer=europe.
185. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 597.
186. Steven Ferrey, Auctioning the Building Blocks of Life: Carbon Auction, the Law, and Global Warming, 23 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 317, 330 (2009).
187. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 581-82 (3d ed. 2010).
188. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999);
189. MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF U. S. ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING WITH POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2003);
190. CAPTURING THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING (Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009);
191. John A. Anderson, Electricity Restructuring: A Review of Efforts Around the World and the Consumer Response, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 70 (2009).
192. The Supreme Court ruled states powerless to set prices for interstate electricity transactions in Public Utilities Comm. of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927). The regulatory gap that ensued until federal regulation commenced was known as the "Attleboro gap"
193. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63 (1982);
194. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition on the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1983);
195. PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983).
196. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Using the Gas Industry as a Guide to Reconstituting the Electricity Industry, 13 RESOURCES L. & ECON. 7 (1991).
197. FERC's authority to regulate and restructure electricity markets received the careful scrutiny of the Supreme Court in New York v. FERC, 535 U. S. 1(2002), in which the Court reviewed FERC's Order No. 888 of 1996, one of the most important of the restructuring rules.
198. FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21, 540 (1996).
199. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005).
200. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/ indus-act/rto.asp.
201. See, e.g., RGGI, INC., RGGI STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING #8: MEETING SUMMARY 10 (May 19, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/final-summary-5-19-05. pdf.
202. Recall that in restructured markets, power generators have greater flexibility to pass increased costs along to end users without the approval of state public utility commissions. See supra Section I. B.2. See also William Shobe et al., An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances Under a Loose Cap, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 162, 165 (2010).
203. 2). See RGGI Goes Live, and
204. Stephen Ward, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Up for Debate, 12 CHOICES: IDEAS FOR SHARED PROSPERITY 1, 3 (2006).
205. MAINE S. JOURNAL, 123rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. S-874 (June 6, 2007) (comment by Senator Bartlett from Cumberland, Maine).
206. Ross GITTELL & MATT MAGNUSSON, ECONOMIC IMPACT IN NEW HAMPSHIRE OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT 3, 68 (Jan. 2008).
207. Rick Valliere, N. H. Senate Sustains Governor's Veto of Bill to Quit Cap-and-Trade Program, STATE ENV'T DAILY, Sept. 8, 2011, BNA Bloomberg.
208. See Matthias Ruth et al., Economic and Energy Impacts from Participation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A Case Study of the State of Maryland, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 2279 (2008);
209. MATTHIAS RUTH, THE ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY SPENDING IN MARYLAND'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2008).
210. An important line of work in political science builds on the premise that legislative behavior can be explained largely in terms of lawmakers' single-minded pursuit of reelection. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
211. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990).
212. See Christopher Rizzo, Cap-and-Trade Under Attack Around the Nation, GREENLAW (June 29, 2011), http://greenlaw.blogs.law.pace.edu/2011/06/29/cap-and- trade-under-attack-around-the-nation/;
213. see also Thrun v. Cuomo, No. 4385-11 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. June 12, 2012).
214. See Ray Pospisil & Lisa Wood, New Democratic Governors Boosting RGGI Prospects in Massachusetts and Maryland, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Nov. 27, 2006, LexisNexis.
215. For approaches from political science, see Francis Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990);
216. Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 840 (2008);
217. Brady Baybeck, William D. Berry, & David A. Siegel, A Strategic Theory of Policy Diffusion via Intergovernmental Competition, 73 J. POL. 232 (2011).
218. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1210 (1992);
219. Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, The Politics of Local Climate Change Initiatives, 32 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 6 (2007);
220. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995);
221. Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2005).
222. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESTRUCTURING IN RETROSPECT (2001).
223. Of the northeastern states that pursued restructuring, only Delaware did not order divestiture generally. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1013 (2013).
224. See Allowance Allocation, RGGI (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.rggi.org/ market/co2-auctions/allowance-allocation.
225. See Regina R. Johnson, The Shrinking Industry, 137 PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY 62 (1999).
226. Letter from Joseph M. Kwasnik, Vice President, Env't Dep't, National Grid, to the RGGI State Working Group (Aug. 29, 2005) (on file with author).
227. See also Cook, Arenas of Power, supra note 142, at 476 (noting the impact of National Grid's position).
228. Information about the distribution of auction revenues is tracked on the RGGI website at http://rggi.org/rggi-benefits/program-investments.
229. Tom Tietenberg, Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an Economic Idea, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 359, 364 (2010).
230. Michael E. Levine, Regulation, the Market, and Interest Group Cohesion: Why Airlines Were Not Reregulated, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 215 (Marc K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 2007).
231. The program is a part of an ambitious suite of initiatives put into place by the state's Global Wanning Solutions Act of 2006, more commonly referred to as AB 32 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (2013)).
232. The cap-and-trade program regulations can be found at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95800-96023 (2013).
233. The program's auction provisions are described in CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95870-95942.
234. See Anne C Mulkem & Debra Kahn, Business Group Asks Gov. Brown to Delay Cap and Trade, GREENWIRE (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/ rss/2012/10/18/14;
235. Anne C. Mulkem, Cap-and-Trade System Likely to Survive Lawsuits-Experts, GREENWIRE (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/climate-digest/2012/ 10/26/3.
236. See Carolyn Whetzel, California Chamber Files Lawsuit Claiming State Auction of Emission Allowances Illegal, DAILY ENV'T REP., NOV. 14, 2012, at A15.
237. see also Rhead Enion, Second California Cap-and-Trade Auction Sells Almost $225 Million Worth of Allowances, LEGALPLANET (Feb. 25, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/secondcalifomia-cap-and-trade- auction-sells-almost-225-million-worth-of-allowances/.
238. See Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002).
239. Industries covered by the program include cement, glass, iron, and steel production, pulp and paper manufacturing, and petroleum refining, among others. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811 (2013).
240. State laws and regulations implementing RGGI can be found at http://www.rggi.org/design/regulations.
241. 2007 Conn. Acts 07-242 (Reg. Sess.) (enacting House Bill No. 7432).
242. 2 Plan, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, June 21, 2007, at 28 (describing L. D. 1851, enacted June 12, 2007).
243. 2008 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
244. 2008 Mass. Acts ch. 169 (signed by the Governor July 2, 2008).
245. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 125-0:21 (III), 23 (II) (2013) (requiring that "all revenue from sale of allowances at auction shall be deposited into greenhouse'gas emissions reduction fund;" "[f]und moneys shall be used to support energy efficiency, conservation, and demand response programs" and not for any other purpose).
246. See HB 1434-Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative-Key Vote, PROJECT VOTE SMART, http://www.votesmart.org/bill/6500/19175/regional-greenhouse-gas- initiative (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
247. A. B. 4559, 212th Leg., 2d Sess. (N. J. 2008).
248. 19 N. J LEGISLATIVE DIGEST 3 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2008).
249. This point is, however, presently under litigation. See Press Release, Competitive Enterprise Inst., Multi-State Greenhouse Gas Initiative Violates New York Law, Lawsuit Alleges (June 28, 2011), available at http://cei.org/news- releases/multi-state-greenhouse-gas-initiative-violates-new-yoric-lawlawsuit- alleges.
250. A prior lawsuit on the same question was settled in late 2009. Vicki Shiah, Settlement Reached in Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Lawsuit, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 14, 2010, 3:20 PM), http://www.enn. com/pollution/article/ 40925.
251. R. I. GEN. LAWS § 23-82-6 (a) (2013).
252. S. JOURNAL, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 85 (R. I. 2007), available at http://www.riHn. state.ri.us/journals07/senatejournals07/sjoumal6-22.pdf.
253. H. JOURNAL, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 130 (R. I. 2007), available at http://www.rilm. state.ri.us/journals07/housejournals07/hjournal6-22.pdf.
254. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 255 (2013) (approved May 2, 2006, as Act 123).
255. VT. S. CALENDAR, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Adjourned Sess., at 1073 (Apr. 6, 2006), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2006/calendar/SC060406.htm