메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 103, Issue , 2013, Pages 29-43

The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements

Author keywords

Learning; Self enforcing agreements; Transnational cooperation; Uncertainty; Voluntary provision of public goods

Indexed keywords


EID: 84878145539     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (45)

References (46)
  • 2
    • 84960595179 scopus 로고
    • Self-enforcing international environmental agreements
    • Barrett S. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 1994, 46:878-894.
    • (1994) Oxford Economic Papers , vol.46 , pp. 878-894
    • Barrett, S.1
  • 3
    • 0035167207 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • International cooperation for sale
    • Barrett S. International cooperation for sale. European Economic Review 2001, 45(10):1835-1850.
    • (2001) European Economic Review , vol.45 , Issue.10 , pp. 1835-1850
    • Barrett, S.1
  • 5
    • 33744531613 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Climate treaties and "breakthrough" technologies
    • Barrett S. Climate treaties and "breakthrough" technologies. American Economic Review 2006, 96(2):22-25.
    • (2006) American Economic Review , vol.96 , Issue.2 , pp. 22-25
    • Barrett, S.1
  • 6
    • 84896189890 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers
    • Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, (et al., ch. 2), C. Carraro (Ed.)
    • Bloch F. Non-cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions 2003, 35-79. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, (et al., ch. 2). C. Carraro (Ed.).
    • (2003) The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions , pp. 35-79
    • Bloch, F.1
  • 8
    • 77955276300 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Providing global public goods under uncertainty
    • Boucher V., Bramoullé Y. Providing global public goods under uncertainty. Journal of Public Economics 2010, 94:591-603.
    • (2010) Journal of Public Economics , vol.94 , pp. 591-603
    • Boucher, V.1    Bramoullé, Y.2
  • 11
    • 34249001730 scopus 로고
    • Strategies for the international protection of the environment
    • Carraro C., Siniscalco D. Strategies for the international protection of the environment. Journal of Public Economics 1993, 52(3):309-328.
    • (1993) Journal of Public Economics , vol.52 , Issue.3 , pp. 309-328
    • Carraro, C.1    Siniscalco, D.2
  • 13
    • 41049108657 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement
    • Dellink R., Finus M., Olieman N. The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement. Environmental and Resource Economics 2008, 39(4):357-377.
    • (2008) Environmental and Resource Economics , vol.39 , Issue.4 , pp. 357-377
    • Dellink, R.1    Finus, M.2    Olieman, N.3
  • 14
    • 0000715119 scopus 로고
    • Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition
    • Deneckere R., Davidson C. Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition. The Rand Journal of Economics 1985, 16(4):473-486.
    • (1985) The Rand Journal of Economics , vol.16 , Issue.4 , pp. 473-486
    • Deneckere, R.1    Davidson, C.2
  • 15
    • 44449148358 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stable international environmental agreements: an analytical approach
    • Diamantoudi E., Sartzetakis E.S. Stable international environmental agreements: an analytical approach. Journal of Public Economic Theory 2006, 8(2):247-263.
    • (2006) Journal of Public Economic Theory , vol.8 , Issue.2 , pp. 247-263
    • Diamantoudi, E.1    Sartzetakis, E.S.2
  • 17
    • 84866764240 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
    • University of Stirling
    • Eyckmans J., Finus M. An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities. Stirling Discussion Paper Series, 2009-10 2009, University of Stirling.
    • (2009) Stirling Discussion Paper Series, 2009-10
    • Eyckmans, J.1    Finus, M.2
  • 18
    • 28444448143 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Transboundary Pollution
    • Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, (ch. 3), H. Folmer, T. Tietenberg (Eds.)
    • Finus M. Stability and Design of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Transboundary Pollution. International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2003/4 2003, 82-158. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, (ch. 3). H. Folmer, T. Tietenberg (Eds.).
    • (2003) International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, 2003/4 , pp. 82-158
    • Finus, M.1
  • 19
    • 0141760632 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Oslo protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?
    • Finus M., Tjøtta S. The Oslo protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?. Journal of Public Economics 2003, 87(9-10):2031-2048.
    • (2003) Journal of Public Economics , vol.87 , Issue.9-10 , pp. 2031-2048
    • Finus, M.1    Tjøtta, S.2
  • 21
    • 0041412755 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: the economics of the precautionary principle
    • Gollier C., Treich N. Decision-making under scientific uncertainty: the economics of the precautionary principle. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2003, 27(1):77-103.
    • (2003) Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , vol.27 , Issue.1 , pp. 77-103
    • Gollier, C.1    Treich, N.2
  • 22
    • 3142702104 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment
    • Haeringer G. Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment. Journal of Economic Theory 2004, 117(1):140-143.
    • (2004) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.117 , Issue.1 , pp. 140-143
    • Haeringer, G.1
  • 23
    • 0014413249 scopus 로고
    • The tragedy of the commons
    • Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 1968, 162(3859):1243-1248.
    • (1968) Science , vol.162 , Issue.3859 , pp. 1243-1248
    • Hardin, G.1
  • 24
    • 0032171493 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • International cooperation behind the veil of uncertainty
    • Helm C. International cooperation behind the veil of uncertainty. Environmental and Resource Economics 1998, 12(2):185-201.
    • (1998) Environmental and Resource Economics , vol.12 , Issue.2 , pp. 185-201
    • Helm, C.1
  • 25
    • 0000596847 scopus 로고
    • International environment conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions
    • Hoel M. International environment conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environmental and Resource Economics 1992, 2(2):141-159.
    • (1992) Environmental and Resource Economics , vol.2 , Issue.2 , pp. 141-159
    • Hoel, M.1
  • 26
    • 85050414370 scopus 로고
    • Analytical uncertainty and international cooperation: theory and application to international economic policy coordination
    • Iida K. Analytical uncertainty and international cooperation: theory and application to international economic policy coordination. International Studies Quarterly 1993, 37:431-457.
    • (1993) International Studies Quarterly , vol.37 , pp. 431-457
    • Iida, K.1
  • 27
    • 54949159573 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Climate Change 2007
    • IPCC
    • IPCC Climate Change 2007. Synthesis Report 2007.
    • (2007) Synthesis Report
  • 28
    • 84856212468 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The effect of learning on membership and welfare in an international environmental agreement
    • Karp L. The effect of learning on membership and welfare in an international environmental agreement. Climatic Change 2011, 10.1007/s10584-011-0134-5.
    • (2011) Climatic Change
    • Karp, L.1
  • 29
    • 17844388883 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Piercing the veil of uncertainty in transboundary pollution agreements
    • Kolstad C.D. Piercing the veil of uncertainty in transboundary pollution agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics 2005, 31(1):21-34.
    • (2005) Environmental and Resource Economics , vol.31 , Issue.1 , pp. 21-34
    • Kolstad, C.D.1
  • 30
    • 33845922925 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements
    • Kolstad C.D. Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Managament 2007, 53(1):68-79.
    • (2007) Journal of Environmental Economics and Managament , vol.53 , Issue.1 , pp. 68-79
    • Kolstad, C.D.1
  • 31
    • 46649110761 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Learning and international environmental agreements
    • Kolstad C.D., Ulph A. Learning and international environmental agreements. Climatic Change 2008, 89(1-2):125-141.
    • (2008) Climatic Change , vol.89 , Issue.1-2 , pp. 125-141
    • Kolstad, C.D.1    Ulph, A.2
  • 32
    • 80053912849 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Uncertainty, learning and heterogeneity in international environmental agreements
    • Kolstad C.D., Ulph A. Uncertainty, learning and heterogeneity in international environmental agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics 2011, 50:389-403.
    • (2011) Environmental and Resource Economics , vol.50 , pp. 389-403
    • Kolstad, C.D.1    Ulph, A.2
  • 33
    • 33845897404 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations
    • McGinty M. International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxford Economic Papers 2007, 59:45-62.
    • (2007) Oxford Economic Papers , vol.59 , pp. 45-62
    • McGinty, M.1
  • 34
    • 0031816978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • International environmental agreements under uncertainty
    • Na S.-L., Shin H.S. International environmental agreements under uncertainty. Oxford Economic Papers 1998, 50(2):173-185.
    • (1998) Oxford Economic Papers , vol.50 , Issue.2 , pp. 173-185
    • Na, S.-L.1    Shin, H.S.2
  • 35
    • 21844520434 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers
    • Poyago-Theotoky J. Equilibrium and optimal size of a research joint venture in an oligopoly with spillovers. The Journal of Industrial Economics 1995, 43(2):209-226.
    • (1995) The Journal of Industrial Economics , vol.43 , Issue.2 , pp. 209-226
    • Poyago-Theotoky, J.1
  • 36
    • 33645855227 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited
    • Rubio S.J., Ulph A. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited. Oxford Economic Papers 2006, 58(2):233-263.
    • (2006) Oxford Economic Papers , vol.58 , Issue.2 , pp. 233-263
    • Rubio, S.J.1    Ulph, A.2
  • 37
    • 35548986248 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
    • Rubio S.J., Ulph A. An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2007, 54(3):296-310.
    • (2007) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management , vol.54 , Issue.3 , pp. 296-310
    • Rubio, S.J.1    Ulph, A.2
  • 39
    • 33846790582 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change
    • Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, (Published 2007)
    • Stern N. Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Report prepared for the HM Treasury in the UK 2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, (Published 2007).
    • (2006) Report prepared for the HM Treasury in the UK
    • Stern, N.1
  • 40
    • 3042717609 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Learning about Global Warming?
    • Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, (et al., ch. 13), N. Hanley, H. Folmer (Eds.)
    • Ulph A. Learning about Global Warming?. Game Theory and the Environment 1998, 255-286. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, (et al., ch. 13). N. Hanley, H. Folmer (Eds.).
    • (1998) Game Theory and the Environment , pp. 255-286
    • Ulph, A.1
  • 41
    • 3042756733 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
    • Ulph A. Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2004, 29(1):53-73.
    • (2004) Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , vol.29 , Issue.1 , pp. 53-73
    • Ulph, A.1
  • 42
    • 68249143381 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cartel stability under optimal sharing rule
    • Weikard H.-P. Cartel stability under optimal sharing rule. The Manchester School 2009, 77:575-593.
    • (2009) The Manchester School , vol.77 , pp. 575-593
    • Weikard, H.-P.1
  • 43
    • 33645878585 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements
    • Weikard H.-P., Finus M., Altamirano-Cabrera J.C. The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 2006, 58(2):209-232.
    • (2006) Oxford Economic Papers , vol.58 , Issue.2 , pp. 209-232
    • Weikard, H.-P.1    Finus, M.2    Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C.3
  • 44
    • 0030318189 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good
    • Yi S.-S. Endogenous formation of customs unions under imperfect competition: open regionalism is good. Journal of International Economics 1996, 41:153-177.
    • (1996) Journal of International Economics , vol.41 , pp. 153-177
    • Yi, S.-S.1
  • 45
    • 0031206598 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Stable coalition structures with externalities
    • Yi S.-S. Stable coalition structures with externalities. Games and Economic Behavior 1997, 20(2):201-237.
    • (1997) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.20 , Issue.2 , pp. 201-237
    • Yi, S.-S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.